AGCO. Sembrando para el futuro

Muy interesante el análisis, además hay que destacar la inversión en AGCO por parte de una de las mujeres más ricas de la India, Mallika Srinivasan, creo que tiene casi el 9% de las acciones, lo cual es una muy buena noticia para su expansión en India.

http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2014/09/03/agco-and-indias-tafe-reach-agreement-governing-any.html?page=all

http://finance.yahoo.com/q/it?s=AGCO+Insider+Transactions

Tengo mi cuenta de valores en la caixa

Puedes decir que broker utilizas par comprar las nokian? Gracias de antemano.

No me atrevo a valorar la empresa sin haberla estudiado correctamente, pero me parece una muy buena empresa lo cual, ya es mucho, aunque me temo que esta cara, y que este tipo de empresas dificilmente estan baratas, por lo que son muy complicadas para invertir en ellas.

Supongo que habra que esperar a la proxima gran crisis para que me centre en ella con mas atencion.

Hola Merowingio, que opinas de Grifols?

Incluso con las bajadas recientes en la cotizacion, creo que todavía estaría cara, ¿pero la consideras una buena empresa para comprar en algun momento si el precio lo permite?

Pues compartimos empresa en el radar, y espero que pronto en cartera.

Ya la he añadido a la cartera, un 9 % de peso.

Por cierto ellos tb estan recomprando acciones ( buena señal )

Cuando se pretende invertir en agricultura ( esto no deja de ser una inversion en agricultura ) las malas cosechas, heladas, precios bajos etc etc han de estar contempladas.

La rentablidad qu se puede esperar de AGCO a largo plazo es lo que me ha hecho incorporarla a la cartera.

Venga, hago yo el chiste fácil. La verdad es que la empresa no me da níngún AGCO, je, je.

Pues me gusta Merowingio. Como amenazas tenemos malas cosechas o previsiones de tenerlas, así como la competencia (Deere, Caterpillar). Pero el trabajo orgánico interno parece bueno. Aún no contando con el goodwill parece que hay buenos números y me parece digno de elogio como a pesar de tan adquisición siguen arrojando beneficios y un FCF positivo.

Enhorabuena.

Saludos.

Muchas gracias por la aclaración.

Saludos!

Muchas gracias por esta recomendación Merowingio, me parece muy buena la compañía, copio un analisis premium de Monrningstar por si te interesa:

http://www.xyleminc.com/en-us/Pages/default.aspx

We believe Xylem is a good-quality company with investment merits in the water industry. The firm's target market lies in the highly engineered portion of the global water business, where defensibility and margins are greater. In this market, the company enjoys a top-two position and is at the forefront of product innovation. The company's technical expertise, along with aftermarket switching costs created by selling original equipment that can be replaced by parts only Xylem can produce, provides the source for respectable operating margins, a mild degree of economic profits, and a narrow moat rating.

Still, Xylem is not exactly a growth company despite its pure-play position in the water industry. The water transport, treating, and testing firm has not proved immune to economic conditions and has operationally performed in the bottom half of our diversified industrial coverage list since it spun off from ITT in late 2011. The short-cycle company is subject to customer order delays and cancellations related to new capacity installations or replacing aging infrastructure when economic conditions or municipal budgets warrant customer conservatism.

Demand in the company's largest two end markets, industrial and public utility (together composing 78% of revenue), has been challenged as customers have pulled back on capital expenditures and preventative maintenance. We forecast nominal GDP-type organic growth for Xylem over our five-year forecast, and that assumes some recovering in its end markets. We also find the company's original five-year 13%-14% return on invested capital target (from a 9.9% average over the past four years) to be a stretch goal, given our view of normalized low-single-digit organic revenue growth from a largely mature industry and insufficient margin-enhancing differentiation. There is hope for greater improvement, though, with Patrick Decker taking the CEO reins with a goal of driving greater operational efficiencies.

Economic Moat 07/30/2014
We assign Xylem a narrow economic moat because the firm has created a moderate degree of switching costs for its customers. The firm basically operates a razor/razor blade model of selling original-equipment manufacturer products at relatively low margin in order to increase an installed base from which it can extract higher-margin aftermarket revenue. Total aftermarket revenue constitutes about 38% of revenue but 60% of operating income, implying that aftermarket margins are 2.4 times greater than OEM margins. Once Xylem sells OEM products that can carry useful lives of 5 to more than 50 years, it can predictably sell aftermarket parts and service for years to come because only its parts are compatible for a repair. When it comes time to replace aged equipment, customers overwhelmingly return to Xylem because of strong brand loyalty and no need to retrain people on how to maintain the equipment. In the case of pumps, a guarantee that Xylem's pumps will deliver at least 25% increased energy efficiency over competitors' pumps keeps customers reluctant to switch. Xylem also enjoys a small degree of bargaining power over its distributors (channel is half of sales) because its distributors are more reliant on Xylem than Xylem is reliant on its distributors. Xylem works with more than 2,700 distributors and enjoys a top-two position across its markets with double-digit market shares. We believe these switching costs, and to a lesser extent pricing power, have helped the firm generate around 10% returns on invested capital in a cyclically challenging market environment.

That being said, Xylem participates in highly fragmented industries with a few companies near its size and several thousand much smaller. While the firm enjoys some pricing power with highly engineered products in the water infrastructure segment, products in the applied water segment (36% of revenue) are less differentiated and face more competitive pricing. We believe this exposure acts to constrain returns from reaching even higher levels and prevents us from assigning the company a wide economic moat.

Valuation 10/28/2014
We are maintaining our fair value estimate at $33 per share following third-quarter earnings as a stronger dollar relative to the euro is offset by the time value of money. At $33, Xylem would trade for 14.4 times and 13.0 times our 2015 and 2016 EPS estimates, respectively, and 8.9 times and 8.3 times on EV/EBITDA. These valuation levels are slightly less than peer averages, owing to below-average organic revenue growth prospects. We forecast 2.5% organic revenue growth in 2014, within management's 2%-3% growth guidance. We assume average 4.3% organic revenue growth in 2015-18 as demand resumes at normalized levels. Our model also assumes about 2% of annual inorganic growth, in line with prior management's 2%-4% long-term target. We believe the company will meet the low end of its quest to expand operating margins to 14%-15% by 2017 from 11.8% in 2013 as internal efforts should overcome the stubbornly uncooperative economic environment and difficult industry pricing environment. Upsized restructuring spending in 2013 and 2014 should help rightsize its European cost structure, and we expect nascent Lean Six Sigma and strategic sourcing initiatives to provide some margin benefits beyond 2014. We model 14.1% operating margins in 2017, with expected cyclical recoveries across its end markets to supplement cost cutting benefits. Besides growth and margins, key assumptions to our model include 1.5 times revenue paid for acquisitions and a $1.27 euro. Our discounted cash flow valuation model utilizes a 10% cost of equity and 9.0% cost of capital and includes a $1 fair value hit from underfunded postretirement benefits.

Risk 07/30/2014
We assign Xylem a medium uncertainty rating, given its moderate degree of revenue cyclicality, fairly consistent operating margins in the low double digits to low teens, and low product, customer, and end market concentration. The company has a moderate degree of economic cycle sensitivity given a base of less-cyclical public utility spending (70% for maintenance capital) and nearly 40% aftermarket exposure. Xylem's concentration of sales to Europe, at around 36%, could act as a secular headwind as well given the continent's macroeconomic challenges. A weaker euro could produce negative translation effects as well. As a serial acquirer of higher-multiple, water-related companies, Xylem needs to be careful not to overpay or else realize inadequate returns on invested capital.

Management 07/30/2014
Xylem is led by CEO Patrick Decker, who took over from interim CEO Steven Loranger in March. Loranger did a great job in righting the ship following Gretchen McClain's ouster last September. Our initial view is that Decker is a great fit for the job. Decker brings solid operational experience from his prior role as CEO of industrial servicer Harsco, where he had established programs focused on business simplification, Lean Six Sigma, and continuous improvement. Decker also has extensive knowledge of the water industry, having served as president of Tyco's $4 billion flow control business before its spinoff and sale to Pentair in 2012. We believe Decker should have the skill set to help Xylem tackle still-challenging global demand and improve operational efficiency.

We assign the firm a Standard Stewardship Rating, given its short tenure as a stand-alone company and recent change in leadership.

Overview

Profile:

Xylem, a pure-play water company, spun off from ITT in late 2011. The firm provides a full spectrum of products for the transportation, treatment, and testing of water. It offers water and wastewater pumps and filtration, disinfection, and biological treatment equipment. The company serves the public utility (34% of revenue), general industrial (45%), commercial (11%), residential (7%), and agricultural (3%) end markets. In 2013, Europe and emerging markets made up 36% and 19% of revenue, respectively.

Y este de AGCO, haber que te parece, por cierto le dan 4 estrellas a la compañía:

Weak farm income in 2014 and 2015 is a challenge; look for AGCO to buffer margins with cost-cutting.

Analyst Note 10/28/2014
Following AGCO’s third-quarter results, we are maintaining our $55 fair value estimate and no-moat rating. AGCO negatively revised its earnings outlook three weeks ago and today’s report reaffirms the prior 2014 outlook for a 9%-11% sales decline and a 28%-31% EPS decline. We remain comfortable at the low end of AGCO’s outlook. We acknowledge that the 2014 and 2015 agricultural outlook is pressured by surplus crop production in North America, Europe, and South America, but we see potential for industry conditions to stabilize by 2016 and see substantial value in AGCO’s shares at the current price level. Consistent with our views, AGCO’s management repurchased 2.2 million shares, while separately, an AGCO affiliate (India based TAFE) has purchased 3.1 million AGCO shares in the last 60 days.

Third-quarter sales declined 13% year over year, with currency headwinds accounting for 0.7% of the sales decline. Operating income declined 44% to $112 million as operating margins contracted 290 basis points. The sales decline was worst in North America (down 23%) to $531 million. Sales in the key Europe/Africa/Middle East region, which is almost half of revenue, only declined 5.6% to $1.026 billion. Sales gains in Turkey and Africa bolstered EAME regional sales, while substantial farm subsidies in Europe also helped protect European farmers from the income declines experienced in North America.

Reflecting the abrupt sales decline, inventories were a high year over year, climbing 15% to $2.3 billion. The company’s 2014 free cash flow outlook had been reduced from $250 million to $125 million--$150 million largely reflected the adverse expansion of inventory. AGCO will reduce fourth-quarter production in a mid-teens range to help reduce its inventory along with dealer inventories. Despite the market turbulence, the balance sheet remains in good shape with a 1.2 times net debt to EBITDA ratio, while gross debt to EBITDA is a manageable 1.5 times.

Investment Thesis 10/07/2014
AGCO is the most globally diversified agricultural machinery company that we follow, and we believe it is leveraged to increasing agricultural mechanization and higher calorie consumption in the emerging markets. For the past decade, the investment thesis for agriculture was based on a need for increased farm productivity in developed markets to satisfy growing ethanol mandates or in emerging markets to satisfy higher caloric intake and changing dietary patterns. Globally, the major ethanol consumers--the United States, Europe, and Brazil--have reduced the pace of ethanol consumption because of ethanol's cost structure and global politics surrounding the use of food to fuel automobiles. Ethanol production will not significantly increase the need for more planted acres and higher acreage yields, but growing emerging-market calorie consumption and dietary patterns will increase the need for more crops. With nearly 30% of sales from emerging markets, AGCO is highly leveraged to changing emerging-market dietary patterns.

AGCO manufactures a wide range of agricultural machinery. Sixty percent of sales come from tractors that it sells under the Challenger, Fendt, Massey Ferguson, and Valtra brands. Hay tools, forage equipment, and engines are the second-largest product line, generating 9% of sales. Combines along with grain and protein production systems each generate 7% of sales. An additional 13% of sales originate from replacement part sales. Products are sold through a large but independent network of 3,100 dealers. Although AGCO has an expansive dealer network, it needs to support multiple subscale brands with limited marketing and research and development budgets. This limits its ability to more aggressively compete against its strongest rival, Deere. In North America, AGCO is the third-largest tractor manufacturer with 10% share. In emerging markets, AGCO has a far more impressive leadership position. In the high-growth Brazilian agriculture market, which has benefited from growing ethanol mandates and higher-calorie diets, AGCO has a commanding 50% share.

Economic Moat 10/07/2014
AGCO has generated an attractive 13% return on invested capital over the past decade, but we do not believe it has a moat. In the heavy equipment industry, we generally believe an economic moat is a function of perceived product quality, the quality of the dealer network, and an ability to leverage a captive financing subsidiary. These three factors are usually demonstrated by a manufacturer's ability to maintain and build market share and simultaneously maintain higher-than-peer residual values. AGCO has a mixed score on each of these factors. In the U.S., it has actually seen its brand perception modestly improve, with 17% of owners calling themselves more loyal to the brand than three years ago. Despite the improved survey responses, AGCO's U.S. market share has been relatively unchanged over the past few years at approximately 10%. In Brazil, AGCO is far better positioned, enjoying a relatively stable 50% market share. While this is impressive, the Brazilian farm equipment market is one fourth the size of the U.S. market, and it is hard for us to base our moat trend on dominant share in only one market.

Although the company has done a good job gradually segmenting its four largest brands--Challenger, Fendt, Valtra, and Massey Ferguson--the multibrand strategy results in an uphill battle for brand recognition. We think having many brands makes it difficult to effectively manage the dealer network and create effectively segmented products. Wide-moat Deere does almost $200 million of annual advertisement spending and $1.5 billion of R&D investment for one line of products and enjoys 50% share in the United States. In contrast, AGCO splits a $60 million advertising budget across more than four brands. The structural advantage of a well-perceived brand with dominant market share has allowed Deere to generate a 25% average ROIC over the past decade relative to AGCO's 13% average ROIC. We think Deere's price leadership position and focus on high ROICs help support AGCO's profitability.

Also, AGCO's captive financing vehicle is a mixed blessing. The entity is a joint venture with Rabobank, a European food- and agriculture-oriented bank. We think captive financing firms are a significant competitive tool, because a dealer can sell equipment with previously disclosed credit and financing terms rather than being forced to find financing from a roving menu of constantly changing banks. Having a nonstandard pool of financiers creates variety in credit underwriting, and this variety slows sales and could negatively affect the customer experience. AGCO has a 49% interest in its financing venture, which allows it to consolidate financials, but it also limits AGCO's ability to use the financing vehicle to aggressively pursue market share, because it needs Rabobank's compliance to change the underwriting terms or to enter new business lines.

Valuation 10/07/2014
We've modestly reduced our fair value estimate to $55 per share from $57 to account for weak global sales trends in 2014. With a bumper U.S., European, and South American crop, the company's recently acquired GSI business should enjoy mid-single-digit growth this year. However, we believe AGCO's core tractor and combine market will face headwinds in 2014, owing to lower farmed commodity prices, a resulting drop in farmers' income, and difficult comparisons versus a strong 2013. We now forecast a slight decline in revenue and earnings for the year, although falling capital expenditures should help free cash flow increase. Our longer-term assumptions are largely unchanged. We still expect the firm's continued reduction of brand names, overlapping North American dealerships, and redundant vehicle platforms to drive average midcycle margins to around 7%, slightly above historical averages, but a bit below expected 2013 levels owing to stronger growth in the lower-margin Asia Pacific region and our concerns about industry cyclicality. We anticipate that AGCO will rebound to economic profitability during the next five years, although these outsize returns on invested capital aren't likely to remain during future downturns.

Risk 10/07/2014
Over the short term, AGCO's results are heavily tied to global farm income, changes in government subsidies, government tax or depreciation schemes, and weather. One third of the firm's revenue comes from Western Europe, where agricultural subsidies are a more significant portion of farmers' income than in the U.S. Any change in the Western European subsidy framework would alter our outlook. Additionally, 20% of revenue comes from South America, where the Brazilian government delayed implementing financing subsidies. In the first quarter, sales declined 30 percentage points because of this delay. Although the financing subsidy was recently re-enacted, delays in approving or discontinuing subsidies can materially shift short-term purchase decisions by clients.

Management 10/07/2014
We give AGCO a Standard Stewardship Rating. Over the past decade, the company has aggressively closed several acquisitions, including Challenger (2002), Valtra (2004), and GSI (2012). Over this period AGCO has simultaneously increased overall ROICs, suggesting that it is among the minority of companies able to successfully integrate acquisitions. We also like the company's recent decision to repatriate cash to the U.S. in a tax-efficient manner. Although it is yet to be seen whether the company will repurchase its shares at an attractive discount to fair value, we are happy that it is exploring ways to return cash to shareholders.

The company is led by Martin Richenhagen, who has been CEO since 2004 and chairman since 2006. His experience includes several years as a group president of Claas, a European farm equipment manufacturer. We like that stock grants are a large portion of management pay and that key metrics include returns on invested capital and free cash flow.

Overview

Profile:

Duluth, Georgia-based AGCO manufactures agricultural equipment through its Challenger, Massey Ferguson, Fendt, Valtra, and GSI brands. The firm generates 51% of sales in the EMEA region, with North America (26% of sales) and South America (19% of sales) representing other significant sales territories. The company also has a 49% interest in AGCO Finance, a venture established with Rabobank to finance customer purchases and dealer floor plan financing. The company has more than 14,000 employees worldwide.

A ver que piensas...

Un s2 compy

Respecto a mis amigas Nokian..... no te fies de ninguna.

Los resultados que va a obtener la empresa este año no son representativos, NO SE HAN DADO CIRCUNSTANCIAS NORMALES.

Lo que yo busco, son los beneficios normalizados, quiere decir, los beneficios anuales que podria obtener la empresa en circunstancias normales de negocio y de mercado.

Te adjunto el beneficio neto, y la rentabilidad inicial de NOKIAN d los ultimos años :

N COT Capitalizacion Beneficio neto Rto Inicial
2.004 109 11,08 1.203 74 6,1%
2.005 121 10,71 1.296 82 6,4%
2.006 122 15,49 1.890 107 5,7%
2.007 124 23,98 2.966 169 5,7%
2.008 125 7,84 979 140 14,3%
2.009 127 17,11 2.167 58 2,7%
2.010 129 27,47 3.540 170 4,8%
2.011 131 24,86 3.244 309 9,5%
2.012 132 29,99 3.968 331 8,3%
2.013 133 35,03 4.669 184 3,9%
2.014 133 22,50 2.993 200 6,7%

La rentabilidad inicial que yo tengo anotada en mi hoja de calculo para el año 2014 es 200 M€, pero lo cierto es que me da igual, si presentan 175 no significa nada y si presentan 250 tampoco.

Durante el año 2012, que fue un buen año ( podriamos considerarlo normal, obtuvieron 300 M€ de beneficio )

Con toda esa informacion, lo que realmente es relevante en esta empresa,es que creo que tiene un gran potencial de crecimiento, y crece a tasas superiores al 15 %, con esa velocidad de crecimiento y al precio que pagas ahora por los benefcicios, el rendimiento que puedes esperar de ella en el futuro es bastante elevado, siempre y cuando quieras estar expuesto a Rusia ( yo si quiero ).

Para el sector agua mirate XYLEM, esta cara, pero es buena empresa.

Piensa en el monton de depuradoras de aguas residuales que se han construido en el mundo y las que se van a construir, y esta gente trabaja en ese sector (bombas, tratamientos... ), no la tengo analizada, pero se que el producto es bueno y se va a seguir vendiendo dentro de 10 años, probablemente en mucha mayor cantidad.

Tengo problemas para calcular la rentabilidad inicial de Nokian Tyres; en función de la web que consulte me aparecen unos BPA demasiado diferentes...

En una web aparecen un BPA de 1.67 euros como BPA estimado de 2014, la rent. inicial entonces superaría el 7%. En otra web el BPA es de 0.94 lo que da una rent. inicial baja, de un 4% aproximadamente.

No sé de cual fiarme. Al ser una empresa finlandesa no encuentro mucha info en inglés en la web.

Quiero entrar en nokian. Lo que ocurre es que en ib no tienen esta compañía y no se que broker la trabaja.

Hola Merowingio, pues creo que has dado en el clavo en cuanto al sector, creo que a largo plazo tiene un potencial muy grande y sigo mucho a Marc, con su fondo Panda:

https://www.rankia.com/foros/fondos-inversion/temas/2508595-panda-agriculture-water-fund-gran-fondo-para-futuro

Yo de momento estoy seleccionando compañías de estos sectores, si mal no recuerdo creo que AGCO la tuvo o la tiene Marc, en su fondo...
Gracias por el análisis, y la seguiré más de cerca...dentro del largo plazo hay 3 sectores que me encantan:

1-Energías Renovables (Vestas, Solar City, EON, etc)

2-Alimentación (Nestle como madre de todas, pero hay más Viscofan, Ebro Foods, etc)

3-Agricultura y Agua (Aquí es donde estoy buscando compañías para meter en cartera en el futuro)

Un s2 compy

Ya le he dicho a santiago que los cashflows de deere son muy chungos.

Solo el 9% del tiempo desde 1993 ha estado ( AGCO ) tan barata como lo esta ahora, aunque se podrian ver precios mas baratos, yo no esperaria a pillar el precio mas barato, si el planteamiento es a largo plazo (ahora mismo los beneficios POTENCIALES compensan de sobra los riesgos )

Te dire que en los ultimos 10-12 meses es de las pocas oportunidades reales de inversion que he ido encontrando, el resto de cambios en mi cartera fue cambio de cromos, creo que AGCO es una oportunidad por si misma.

Veremos como la encajo en la cartera.

Un saludo

Los numeros de DEERE no me gustan.
Por partes, DE desde 2005 hasta 2013 ha generado 18 MM en flujo de caja operativo y ha necesitado 23.2 MM $ para capex, asi que ha tenido que financiarse y ampliar su deuda en valor 5.6 MM.

Sigo con las Nokian y ademas muy tranquilo con ellas, en cualquier momento ( hablo de meses ) levantaran el vuelo y empezaran a rendir lo que les corresponde, ahora mismo, llevo 2 años con ellas y estan en -11.5% anual, creo que los problemas que ha tenido son exogenos a su modelo de negocio ( multa, rusia... ) y que tiene un buen futuro por delante.

Si tienes dudas en Nokian ...... ( pocas veces vas a tener una oportunidad con tan poco riesgo como la que se da hoy en esta empresa )

Excelente trabajo,
Todas las empresas del sector están acusando la caída de precios de los productos agrícolas , conozco el sector ( cereales y frutas ) de primera mano y pocos tractores se van a comprar este año ...
Como inversión a largo plazo no parece mala empresa ... pero si los cereales no remontan el vuelo , quizás se pueda comprar mas barata en 2015.
Por cierto , Buffett se ha salido totalmente de DEERE.
Salut

Yo llevo deere. Aun tienes las nokian tyres?