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Kodak - Chapter 11: Quiebra

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Kodak - Chapter 11: Quiebra
Kodak - Chapter 11: Quiebra
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#1849

Re: Kodak - Chapter 11: Quiebra

Esta carta se le mando al juez yo se la acabo de enviar al sec

May 21, 2013
The Honorable Judge Allan Gropper
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
One Bowling Green
New York, NY 10004
Case#12-10202 Eastman Kodak Company

Re: Potential Insider Trading by 2nd Lien Lenders and other Secured & Unsecured Creditors/Debt Holders

Dear Honorable Judge Allan Gropper,

Eastman Kodak Company (Debtors) entered a petition under Chapter 11 protection of the Bankruptcy Code on January 19, 2012. Since the petition date the Creditors/Debt Holders of the Secured 2018 Notes, Secured 2019 Notes, Unsecured 2017 Conv., and other Debt instruments (currently referred to as the 2nd Lien Lenders ) have potentially been freely trading these bonds while in possession of Material Non-Public Information (MNPI).
Simply put, the 2nd Lien Lenders, and other financial institutions/companies have potentially been trading the Secured and Unsecured Bonds while having intimate MNPI during the negotiations of the Plan Of Reorganization (POR) between the 2nd Lien Lenders, Unsecured Creditors Committee, and the Debtors since January 19, 2012 and possibly up to the present.

Exhibit A: Article titled “Eastman Kodak Company Announces the Expiration of the Offer to Subscribe for Loans and Exchange Notes for Loans”

www.businesswire.com/news/home/20....Offer-Subscribe

The following excerpt from the above referenced article published on March 15, 2013 stated:

“ROCHESTER, N.Y.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Eastman Kodak Company (“Kodak” or the “Company”) today announced the expiration, at 5:00 p.m. on March 14, 2013, of the offer to holders of its outstanding 10.625% Senior Secured Notes due March 15, 2019 (CUSIP Nos. 277461BK4 and U27746AH6) and 9.75% Senior Secured Notes due March 1, 2018 (CUSIP Nos. 277461BH1 and U27746AG8) (together, the “Notes”) to (i) subscribe for up to an aggregate amount of $455,000,000 of term loans (the “New Money Loans”) under a new junior secured priming superiority debtor-in-possession term loan facility (the “Junior DIP Facility”); and (ii) exchange Notes for up to an aggregate amount of $375,000,000 of junior term loans (the “Junior Loans”) under the Junior DIP Facility. The offer was oversubscribed.”

The Secured Bonds with CUSIP numbers stated above corresponds to the Secured Bonds described in the Form 8-K released by the Debtors on March 25, 2013 (Exhibit B)
Exhibit B: Form 8-K released on March 25, 2013

ek.client.shareholder.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=31235-13-16&CIK=31235

The excerpt from Form 8-K stated:

“On March 22, 2013, Eastman Kodak Company (the “Company”) and its U.S. subsidiaries (the “Subsidiary Guarantors”) entered into a Debtor-in-Possession Loan Agreement (the “Junior DIP Credit Agreement”) with the lenders signatory thereto (the “Lenders”) and Wilmington Trust, National Association, as agent (the “Agent”). Pursuant to the terms of the Junior DIP Credit Agreement, the Lenders provided the Company with term loan facilities in an aggregate principal amount of $848,200,000, consisting of $473,200,000 of new money term loans (the “New Money Loans”) and $375,000,000 of junior term loans (the “Junior Loans”). The Junior Loans were issued in exchange for the same principal amount of Notes (defined below) pursuant to the offer described in item 8.01 of this report. The maturity date of the loans made under the Junior DIP Credit Agreement is the earliest to occur of (i) September 30, 2013, (ii) the effective date of the Company’s plan of reorganization (the “Chapter 11 Plan”) and (iii) the acceleration of such loans. The Junior DIP Credit Agreement provides that, subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions, upon the Company’s emergence from bankruptcy up to $653,700,000 of New Money Loans and the Junior Loans may be converted into loans under an exit facility.

The New Money Loans bear interest at the rate of LIBOR plus 10.5% per annum, with a LIBOR floor of 100 bps. The Junior Loans consist of a tranche in an aggregate principal amount of $126,784,000 bearing interest at a rate of 10.625% per annum and a tranche in an aggregate principal amount of $248,216,000 bearing interest at a rate of 9.75% per annum. Each existing and future direct or indirect U.S. subsidiary of the Company (other than indirect U.S. subsidiaries held through foreign subsidiaries and certain immaterial subsidiaries (if any)) have agreed to provide unconditional guarantees of the obligations of the Company under the Junior DIP Credit Agreement. Subject to certain exceptions, obligations under the Junior DIP Credit Agreement are secured by first, second and third priority liens on all the collateral securing obligations under the Company’s existing DIP credit agreement and 65% of the equity interests of certain material “first-tier” foreign subsidiaries of the Company. The Junior DIP Credit Agreement was approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) in orders issued on January 24, 2013 and March 8, 2013.”

Exhibit C: Docket #3689 filed on May 10, 2013 by Akin Gump et. al. who represents the 2nd Lien Lenders

Starting on page 5 and continued to page 12 includes “Exhibit A & Exhibit B” which lists 2nd Lien Note Holders Committee and Lead Lenders, respectively. The information on these two exhibits details the names, addresses, and “nature & amount of disclosable economic interest” of each financial institution from January 2012 to May 2013.

An easier representation of this information was enumerated in a table that was included in Docket #3730 (filed on May 21, 2013 by a pro se shareholder), page 7, which is duplicated below (Exhibit-1). Information from Docket #0153 was also used to create Exhibit-1.

If we were to focus on Blackstone GSO Capital Partners, they owned as of January 31, 2012, $11 million in Secured 2018 Notes, $47.5 million in Secured 2019 Notes, and $5 million in Unsecured 2017 Conv. Notes. As we move to the second set of columns labeled “Debt Holdings on May 7, 2013”, Blackstone owned $66.3 million in Secured 2018 Notes (an increase of $55.3 million since the petition date), $38.1 million in Secured 2019 Notes (a decrease of $9.4 million since the petition date), $0 in Unsecured 2017 Conv. Notes (a decrease of $5 million since the petition date). As these bonds were being traded, 2nd Lien Lenders such as Blackstone had Material Non-Public Information, since the 2nd Lien Lenders were negotiating the Junior DIP Facility/Exit Facility and the POR.

Blackstone is also the financial advisor to the 2nd Lien Lenders Committee, therefore there is also a potential conflict of interest.

According to the table “Exhibit -1” above, Blackstone is not the only institution that bought (added to their positions) and sold (decreased their positions) since the petition date (January 19, 2012).

It is evident that the 2nd Lien Lenders are also the exit financing lenders, who will be the owners of the new company. They gave themselves a 16% interest rate. Even though New Kodak cash is more than the $653.7 million in exit financing, they get 65% of New Kodak's assets as collateral and forced the Board of Directors/Debtors to give them 85% of the new company.

The 2nd Lien Lenders, and other Unsecured Debt Holders (“Secured and Unsecured Creditors”) had MNPI which outlined and detailed the very last class of stakeholders that would be benefitting from the POR. According to the POR, that was released by the Debtors on April 30, 2013, the Secured and Unsecured Creditors would be awarded 85% and 15% of the new company equity, respectively. Therefore, it isn’t a very large leap of faith to believe that these Secured and Unsecured Creditors positioned themselves and traded from the period starting from the petition date (January 19, 2012) to the release of the POR on April 30, 2013, in order to corner the market and assemble a blocking position in regards to the Secured 2018 & 2019 Notes (which corresponds to the $375 million worth of “Junior Loans” that were given 85% of the new company equity).

Judge Gropper, I implore you to consider the potential of Insider Trading by the Secured and Unsecured Creditors because they were the stakeholders that were negotiating the Junior DIP Facility/Exit Facility, and the POR . They were also the ones that conveniently kept on trading while having full knowledge of where the POR would stop benefitting any stakeholder. That cut off point was the Secured 2018 Notes and Secured 2019 Notes. Not only did some of these 2nd Lien Holders trade in the Secured bonds but they also traded in the Unsecured bonds in order to create a blocking position and monopoly on the new company equity.

I am a single common shareholder that believes in the notion that the equity markets, which Eastman Kodak and many other iconic companies are traded in, are fair and transparent. Obviously, with the Chapter 11 proceedings that have transpired, it has left me, and other shareholders, shocked at the fact that the Board of Directors/Debtors would allow such a lack of fiduciary responsibility to its shareholders. The Board of Directors/Debtors have done nothing to protect the interests of the shareholders. A blatant example is the potential of Insider Trading by the Secured and Unsecured Creditors while being in possession of Material
Non-Public Information.

If Wall Street, the governing regulators, and the US Court System want to promote confidence and transparency among the markets, whether it’s in the equity, bond, or debt markets, retail common shareholders need to be reassured that they are not being exploited, otherwise the whole process and idea of having open markets will never succeed.

If the Secured and Unsecured Creditors claim that there was no Insider Trading, then there would be no harm in appointing an independent Examiner that can investigate, subpoena, and depose (under oath), those entities that might be guilty of Insider Trading.

Equally important, there should also be an appointment of an Official Equity Committee in order to represent the interests of the Common Shareholders, since it is clear that the Board of Directors/ Debtors have neglected their fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders as evidenced in the cancellation of common shares in the POR released on April 30, 2013.

Thank you, Judge Gropper, for taking the time to consider these issues.

Sincerely,

Admin
Administrator

In God We Trust, All Others Pay Cash

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Insider Trading Letters To Judge & US TrusteeMay 22, 2013 at 5:32pm.

Read more: http://kodak.boards.net/thread/5610/insider-trading-letters-judge-trustee##ixzz2VJCLJfnf

#1850

Re: Kodak - Chapter 11: Quiebra

Ay el richaaaaaaaarrrrd!

Esto me pasa por ponerme un nick tan complicado, joder. Me han llamado Sol, Solrre, Solcrack, Soldra y Sole.

Mr. Sniper, buenísima entrada esa a 0.125

Creo que podríamos todos enviarle al juez Gropper una carta similar a la enviada por Ricardo. Nunca se sabe.

Saludos.

#1851

Re: Kodak - Chapter 11: Quiebra

yo pienso que deberiamos haserlo para protegernos ya que nunca se sabe cualquier reclamo posterior tenemos la contancia que el juez fue avisado.
no veo en balance
1)patentes segun dicen 9600 cuando al pareser son 30,000 la media promedio 500,000 por cada una da entre 4800 millones y 15,000 millones
2)inmuebles gran cantidad en usa
3)filiales no estan en chapter 11 pero pertenesen a la empresa
4)empresas donde kodak es accionista o socios
5)credito fiscal(se comenta que hay mas de 2000 millones)
6)si las filiales de kodak son parte de la empresa donde figuran dichos ingresos en los balances
7)el tema del reactor nuclear sacado del sotano de rochester
8)se debe tomar en cuenta los futuros ingresos de la fabricacion de sensores
9) se debe tomar en cuanta que juez aprovo refinanciacion si vendia patentes por 500 millones se cumplio pagaron 527
la segunda condicion venta de 600 millones en activos la venta a kpp supera con creses
por lo que el juez no puede de la noche a la mañana cambiar las reglas que puso por lo tanto quedaria aprovada refinanciacion y por lo tanto no le puede entregar empresa con los ingresos de sensores se podria cancelar a acreedores sobre todo preferentes la deuda seria razonable menor a los activos lejos

#1852

Re: Kodak - Chapter 11: Quiebra

yo le escribi una carta al sec

#1853

Re: Kodak - Chapter 11: Quiebra

Buen trabajo ricardo del peru

#1854

Re: Kodak - Chapter 11: Quiebra

gracias multipliquemos esfuersos yel resultado ser grandioso

#1855

Re: Kodak - Chapter 11: Quiebra

Sullivan & Cromwell, Hogan Lovels asesorar sobre Pacto de Kodak

Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, dirigido por el socio Andrew Dietderich, está asesorando Eastman Kodak Co. (EKDKQ), el pionero de la fotografía en quiebra, en su spin-off de negocios imágenes a su plan de pensiones de U.K. en un acuerdo que coloca $2,8 billones en reclamaciones. Hogan Lovells LLP recomienda el Plan de pensiones de Kodak en el acuerdo, liderado por pensiones Londres socio Katie Banks.

Otros socios de S & C en el acuerdo incluyen a socios corporativos Stephen Kotran y Inosi Nyatta.

Socio de Hogan Lovells estadounidense Christopher R. Donoho III aconsejó sobre reestructuración de negocios y asuntos de insolvencia junto con John H. Booher y Michael J. Silver en materia de fusiones y adquisiciones y Elizabeth M. Donley en materia comercial.

Empresas de imagen personalizada y documento de Kodak se separó para el plan de pensiones, mayor acreedor en el caso de la bancarrota, de Kodak por $650 millones, dijo ayer la compañía en un comunicado.

Kodak, con sede en Rochester, Nueva York, planea archivo hoy ante el Tribunal su plan para salir de la quiebra. El acuerdo de spin-off instala unos $2,8 billones de reclamos por el plan de pensiones contra Kodak, según la declaración.

Kodak dijo este mes que tenía un acuerdo para vender imágenes de documentos activos a la empresa japonesa de equipos de oficina Brother Industries Ltd. (6448) por unos $210 millones. Se dice que retirará la solicitud presentada en la corte pidiéndole permiso para proceder a la venta.

La empresa es la venta de empresas para reducir y financiar su turno en la impresión comercial y embalaje después de buscar la protección del capítulo 11 en enero de 2012.

Es el caso de la bancarrota en Eastman Kodak Co., 12-bk-10202, corte de bancarrota de Estados Unidos, Distrito Sur de Nueva York (Manhattan

#1856

Re: Kodak - Chapter 11: Quiebra

la fuente es bloomberg