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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños

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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños
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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños
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#23657

Re: Los 6 meses tras BK han pasado

Manzana: Si tu estas invertido en el valor deberías conocer la respuesta.
Pero como te gusta preguntarlo te responderé. Durante los 6 meses tras una BK se puede impugnar el resultado de la misma una vez pasada esa fecha ya es 100% valida y aunque hubiera sido un fraude poco se puede hacer... eso es a lo que han esperado los Hedge Funds para a partir de próximas fechas empezar a desarrollar su plan libre de posibles cargos.

Quedan 6 meses para la fecha máxima para la primera junta de accionistas y 3 meses y medio hasta finales de año para hacer uso a los NOL´s Billonarios. No se cuanto van a tardar en mover ficha pero yo tengo mis tickets sacado esperando que suene la campana.

#23658

TPS eran los Jinetes del Apocalipsis

3.5 billion rejected were the TPS claims, since they were transferred to preferred equity, their claims should be gone. Nothing new.

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229120917000000000013.pdf

HOWEVER, what IS interesting in Exhibit A of that document is WHO owned the TPS....look through out, it's our favorite friends:

1) Appaloosa, unliquidated
2) Centerbridge, unliquidated
3) Aurelius, ~ $188 million claim
4) Goldman Sachs, ~ $70 million claim

Estos son algunos de los dueños de WMIH, igual que nosotros.
¿Creeis que les gusta perder dinero? :) :) :)

#23659

El Potencial de WMIH

http://www.zenpenny.com/wmih-research/

In March, shares of a restructured Washington Mutual began trading on the pink sheets. Trading as high as 1.14 on the first day of trading, the shares have now settled into trading around .50 cents per share. The shares trade under the symbol WMIH. What follows are the reasons I have made this the largest position in the portfolios and believe it is a multi-year hold:
I’m going to begin with the facts regarding the newly issued WMIH shares. Washington Mutual Holdings has very little tangible information with respect to its current business. This makes a valuation proposition a difficult task given the fact that this is a newly formed entity that hasn’t filed a 10-Q, much less a 10-K. The company consists of one active business component — WMMRC. This stands for Washington Mutual Mortgage Reinsurance Corporation.
What little information is available on WMMRC is available through bankruptcy filings:
http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229100326000000000009.pdf
WM Mortgage Reinsurance Company, Inc.
WM Mortgage Reinsurance Company, Inc. (previously defined as “WMMRC”), a Hawaiian corporation and non-debtor,wholly-owned subsidiary of WMI, is a captive reinsurance company, created to reinsure the risk associated with residential mortgages that were originated or acquired by WMB. Mortgage insurance for WMB-originated or acquired loans had historically been provided by seven mortgage insurance companies (collectively, the “Mortgage Insurers”), although currently WMMRC is party to mortgage reinsurance agreements with only six mortgage insurance
companies. WMMRC entered into reinsurance agreements (the “Reinsurance Agreements”) with each Mortgage Insurer, pursuant to which it would share in the risk, in the form of claim losses, in exchange for a portion of the premiums generated from the residential mortgage loan portfolio held by the Mortgage Insurer.
Pursuant to each Reinsurance Agreement, WMMRC established a trust account with US Bank N.A. (collectively, the “Trusts”), for the benefit of the Mortgage Insurer, to hold premiums collected and to secure WMMRC’s obligations to each Mortgage Insurer with respect to the insured loans. WMMRC was historically party to seven trust agreements – one for each Reinsurance Agreement
to which it was a party. As of December 31, 2009, the value of the six remaining Trust assets was estimated to be $460 million. Each Reinsurance Agreement requires that WMMRC maintain a certain minimum amount of capital in the applicable Trust (the “Reinsurance Reserve”), which amount is determined by applicable law, as well as each Mortgage Insurer’s calculation of reserves needed, which is generally inclusive of reserves for known delinquencies within the loan portfolio and a percentage of the remaining aggregate risk exposure contained in each portfolio. Minimum capital requirements fluctuate on a monthly basis and are reflected in monthly “cession statements” provided by each Mortgage Insurer to WMMRC. By order dated December 3, 2008, the Bankruptcy Court approved a loan from WMI to WMMRC in the amount of approximately $11.9 million in order to maintain an adequate Reinsurance Reserve in one of its Trusts. As of the Commencement Date, due to the Bank Receivership and the sale of substantially all of WMB’s assets to JPMC, all of the Trusts are operating on a “run-off” basis because WMMRC has ceased to reinsure any new WMB-originated loans. WMMRC’s failure to maintain adequate Reinsurance Reserves could result in the Mortgage Insurers’ election to terminate the Reinsurance Agreements on a “cut-off” basis, in which case WMMRC would no longer be liable for the reinsured loans and would no longer receive reinsurance premiums with respect thereto. WMMRC would, however, be liable for the Reinsurance Reserve, which may, in certain cases, result in the extinguishment of all assets on account in the Trust at issue. As described above in Section IV.D.11.i, WMMRC is a named party in the Pennsylvania Action.
According to this document dated 2009, the value of the trust assets is $460 million. Equally as important is the fact that WMMRC is not liable for maintaining adequate reserves for reinsurance, absolving them of far reaching liability.
In the bankruptcy filing during Q1 2012, the courts come up with the following plan to create an equity class for investors:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/933136/000090951812000138/mm03-2712_8ke991.htm
The Plan provides that Reorganized WMI (1) will receive $75 million, (2) is valued at $210 million (before receiving the $75 million), which includes $140 million for WMMRC, (3) will issue new common stock, and (4) will issue debt instruments that are repaid solely with the run-off proceeds from WMMRC (the “Runoff Notes”. The new common stock and Runoff Notes were issued on March 23, 2012. The Debtors’ equity holders (and claimants subordinated to the level of equity) received the vast majority of the new equity of Reorganized WMI. Certain elections entitle creditors to receive newly issued common stock and Runoff Notes in lieu of cash as part of their initial distribution (the WMI Liquidating Trust will hold the remaining Runoff Notes until distribution to LTI holders in accordance with the Plan). Therefore, these adjustments reflect the value adjustments to Reorganized WMI in order to show the initial distributions of common stock and Runoff Notes, which occurred on March 23, 2012, and which are deemed to relate back to the Effective Date, March 19, 2012.
The court assigns a very clear valuation to WMIH shares of $210 million, which equates to roughly $1 per share based on 200 million shares outstanding. The current company consists of two primary assets:
1. WMMRC – $140 million valuation given by the bankruptcy court
2. CASH – $75 million in cash to fund ongoing operations
In addition, the company has access to a $120 million credit facility that can be used to merge itself into a new, profitable businesses.
On July 19th, the company announced its plan to have Blackstone Group advise it as to how to best utilize its cash reserve along with its credit facility.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/19/wmiholdings-blackstone-idUSL2E8IJM8820120719?feedType=RSS&feedName=privateEquity&rpc=43
The idea is to find a good management team and a profitable operating business that can be grown, the sources said, adding that the process was still in the initial stages. One attraction for the company is its net operating liabilities, or NOLs, which can be used to reduce the tax bill for a profitable business, the source said. But for that WMI would have to be the buyer, as NOLs do not carry over if the company that holds them is acquired, the source said. “It could create a lot of value to buy a business,” the source said.
Thus far, we have the following picture: A company valued at $210 million by the courts, consisting of two assets CASH ($75 million) and WMMRC ($140 million).
Given the current market price of .50 cents per share, the total market cap of the company is roughly $100 million. The company is currently trading at less than 1.5 times cash, valuing WMMRC at $25 million.
The great mystery of WMMRC that nobody seems to know the answer to is the value of the WMMRC above and beyond the runoff. WMMRC being in runoff basically means that revenues from its operations are being used to pay back notes that borrowed against the valuation of the company. What isn’t known is what is the value in excess of the runoff notes? Why did the courts assign a value of $400 plus million to WMMRC in 2009? Now that same entity is worth $25 million as deemed appropriate by the open market? There seems to be a vast shift in sentiment towards WMMRC that is currently sitting at the bottom range of even the most pessimistic assumptions going forward.
But wait, there is more:
WMIH’s most valuable asset may be its NOLs. Net Operating Liabilities that have been rolled over from the WAMU debacle can essentially be used to create tax free income on any businesses that WMIH chooses to merge/acquire with. The potential value of the NOLs has ranged anywhere from $20 million all the way up to near $7 billion. The bankruptcy courts had this to say about the valuation of the NOLs:
http://sec.edgar-online.com/wmi-holdings-corp/8-k-current-report-filing/2012/03/01/section12.aspx
Pursuant to the September Opinion, and on the basis of the evidence presented at the July Confirmation Hearing, this Court determined that “the value of the existing business of WMMRC (assuming no new business is generated or acquisitions are made) is . . . $140 million.” Conf DX 442 – September Opinion at 45. In addition, this Court determined that Reorganized WMI’s total enterprise value is $210 million, taking into account the value of net operating losses (“ NOLs ”) potentially available to Reorganized WMI, including both “the value of the NOLs to the existing WMMRC business” (which the Court determined had a value of $20 million) and the value of “the NOLs that might be able to be used in the event of a future acquisition of a profitable business” (which this Court determined had a value of $50 million). Conf DX 442 – September Opinion at 47, 62. This Court’s finding as to the value of the NOLs that might be able to be used in the event of a future acquisition of a profitable business was “based on the Court’s conclusion that the Reorganized Debtor should be able to raise additional capital and debt over the next twenty years equal to twice the value of its current assets which will be invested in restarting the reinsurance business of WMMRC or acquiring other related businesses.” Conf DX 442 – September Opinion at 62.
The core of the WMIH business will not be in WMMRC and guessing what the value in excess of the runoff can be. But rather to take advantage of the NOLs to create what will effectively be a leveraged entity creating tax free income. This is the purpose of both the $75 million cash infusion and the $125 million line of credit. These are tools to be used to unlock the value of the NOLs through merger/acquisition of a PROFITABLE company that can utilize the NOLs as much as possible.
What can then happen is that the undesirable “Washington Mutual” name can be shed permanently and the company can reemerge as a completely new entity that has years of tax free income at its disposal to either expand through acquisition or reinvest back into whatever business it so chooses.
Additionally, there are four major hedge funds that have been involved in the Washington Mutual bankruptcy since day one. These hedge funds are Owl Creek Asset Management LP, Appaloosa Management LP, Centerbridge Partners LP and Aurelius Capital Management LP. These hedge funds took part in some questionable strategies in order to be able to control the outcome of the bankruptcy. That outcome involved keeping 100% of the restructured entity for themselves.
What did these giants in the world of finance see in Washington Mutual that made them want to risk insider trading charges (alleged in court http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/news/2011/02_-_february/wamu_shareholders_to_probe_hedge_funds__trades/) in order to take full control of the bankruptcy, effectively shutting retail investors out completely?
We know what they didn’t see as attractive: The $75 million the company has on its balance sheet was given to the WMIH by the hedge funds as a compromise to settle without furthering the allegations of insider trading. We know that WMMRC has a max value of $500 million, which amounts to small bones for these carnivores of finance. The NOLs equal leverage. The hedge funds were 100% after the leverage the nearly $5 billion in NOLs provide.
Now enter Blackstone that has been advising the hedge funds, the courts and now the restructured WMIH since day one. Blackstone is here to advance there use of the NOLs, as per the original plan, except that OTC equity shares will also now participate, instead of simply institutions that were privy to the opportunity and managed to lock all other interested parties out completely.
In order to complete the picture of the power of NOLs when utilized properly, here is a case study: http://seekingalpha.com/article/604461-fairfax-financial-holdings-the-line-between-desperation-and-the-miraculous
This case study doesn’t mean that WMIH is guaranteed to turn out this way. What it does demonstrate is that under the proper guidance, NOLs can be effective tool to create value for a management that knows how to utilize them properly.
Bottomline: Stripping out the $75 million in cash, given the current per share price of .50 cents gives you a market capitalization of $25 million for the remainder of the package. What does that package consist of?
1. WMMRC – Potential value ?
2. NOLs – Potential value ?
3. The potential of Blackstone being able to capitalize on the situation properly and create value where there are only question marks currently. Intellectual capital you can call this.
4. A newly formed board of directors and management team that will be highly incentivized in the near future to create an entity that flourishes.
This is the current list of the board of directors for WMIH http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/equity-committee-nominates-four-board-members-for-reorganized-washington-mutual-inc-138655344.html Doesn’t look like a group that was assembled to insure failure, but rather to properly guide the restructuring.
It seems to me that $25 million is a bottom of the barrel price to pay for four different assets that are being discounted only because they are difficult to value at the present moment. Difficulty in valuation is what creates the most outstanding opportunities in the financial markets.
The question here for investors in WMIH is a question of time? My biggest concern with the company as an investment is not the potential for success but rather the length of time it will take to achieve that success. The question of time should gain clarity over the coming months, into the end of the year.
In the meantime, my time horizon for this investment is not several months, but years. I think this type of mentality towards WMIH as an investment is what will yield the greatest results without the burden of unrealistic expectations for magic to happen at the snap of two fingers.
Given the upside potential (1000% +) I am willing to give it the time it needs to answer all the questions that investors have in a favorable and profitable manner.

#23660

Re: El Potencial de WMIH (Parte 2)

The foundation – Impressive – Review ALL 8K’s since March, 2012!

I know many folks here are very critical and rightfully so to a point. For those people who know how to build buildings and other, think of WMIH as a very solid foundation has to be built before anything else can happen. The problem for WMIH Retailers is we cannot see the whole blueprint and to some that is very troublesome. This point does not bother me so much and the reason is that I know the seduction and persuasion of alcohol, greed, drugs, money and power.

I am also comfortable with being a flea in the bag of these people who are connected, have resources and know the stepping stones to make money that would embarrass most people. With the foundation that WMIH now has and for simplicity let’s just say there are only (fat chance) six billion worth of tax attributes. This is still a huge number, that when coupled with the right people could turn this company’s value into anywhere from three to twelve billion dollars in a very short period of time.

WMIH has two hundred million shares outstanding, it does not take a genius to figure out how high his stock price could go in a short period of time. For all people who have a sincere interest here, I suggest looking at this link and reviewing ALL of the 8K filings that have taken place since mid March, 2012 and then you will have an entirely different view than most do now!

http://sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0000933136&type=&dateb=&owner=include&start=0&count=40

#23661

Re: El Potencial de WMIH (Parte 2)

Hola Simpson:
Pues esta interesante el texto que expones esperemos que el asunto evolucione favorablemente y nos compense la larga espera.!

#23662

Re: El Potencial de WMIH (Parte 2)

Chikis: De aqui a finales de 2012 tendrás la primera respuesta a tus inquietudes.

#23663

Re: El Potencial de WMIH (Parte 2)

Las acciones a parte de las wmih que han dado, para que valen sí salen con valor 0.

#23664

Re: El Potencial de WMIH ( Leed bien estos 2 mensajes)

Hare are two posts from fsshon on IHUB who has one past explanation and then one current explanation. I will repost his older one first from May 21st, 2012 and then his second one.

READ ALL OF THIS>>> Do not forget the "Ordinary Loss" that occurred when the debtors abandoned the stock in WMB. That is a very large sum of money. Probably in the neighborhood of 18 Billion. I know the debtors took some tax losses in 2009, 2010. When the IRS installed the Rule that allows holding companies i.e. WMI to realize an Ordinary Loss instead of an Operation Loss when they lost their main income producing asset i.e WAMU BANKS they did with the expressed intention that the Holding Company could then take an "ORDINARY LOSS" that could be rolled over onto the entities books, therefore allowing the holding companies creditors and shareholders to recoup some investment through an acquisition schedule. Of course IRS does not want to facilitate acquisition to avoid taxes, but that is exactly what they did with this rule. WMIH meets every requirement in the language I have submitted below.

If the Holding Company does not use this Ordinary Loss in the tax year it was acquired i.e 2012, then the Hold Co will have to put the Loss on the books in the NOL category and therefore subject the loss to stricter rules per the IRS. WMI is not going to allow a multi-billion loss now worth 39% to an acquiring firm to just rollover into the NOL category on WMI's books. No, once the BK is completely finalized and all creditors are satisfied, (if I am reading this right) WMIH can then be acquired for the losses as well as the assets. An ordinary loss is not an operating loss. Worthless Stock is just that WORTHLESS !!!

WMI MEETS THE 165 TEST (remember discussions about this in BK court?)

Parent can deduct as ordinary loss worthless securities in wholly-owned subsidiary PLR 201108001 IRS has privately ruled that, provided Code Sec. 165(a) 's and Code Sec. 165(g) 's requirements for claiming a worthless securities deduction are met, a savings and loan (S&L) company may claim an ordinary loss for its basis in the stock of its wholly-owned banking subsidiary. In so holding, IRS determined that the interest on and gains from the sale of the subsidiary's real estate and consumer loans were active receipts for purposes of applying the Code Sec. 165(g)(3) gross receipts test since, until the subsidiary was placed in receivership, it was an active operating company that performed significant services in its banking transactions. Background. If any security that is a capital asset becomes worthless during the tax year, the loss is treated as from the sale or exchange of a capital asset—that is, as a capital loss—on the last day of the tax year. ( Code Sec. 165(g)(1) ) A share of stock in a corporation is included in the definition of a security. ( Code Sec. 165(g)(2) )

Under the Code Sec. 165(g)(3) exception, a domestic corporation can claim an ordinary loss for worthless securities of an affiliated corporation. A corporation is affiliated with the taxpayer if it meets these two tests: ...

Ownership test. The taxpayer must own directly stock in the corporation meeting the requirements of Code Sec. 1504(a)(2) (i.e., at least 80% of the voting power and value of the corporation's stock); ( Code Sec. 165(g)(3)(A) ) and ...

Gross receipts test. More than 90% of the aggregate of the corporation's gross receipts for all tax years must be from sources other than royalties, rents (except rents derived from rental of properties to employees of the corporation in the ordinary course of its operating business), dividends, interest (except interest received on deferred purchase price of operating assets sold), annuities, and gains from sales or exchanges of stocks and securities. ( Code Sec. 165(g)(3)(B) ) Reg. §

1.165-5(d)(2)(iii) provides that the gross receipts test applies for all tax years during which the subsidiary has been in existence. Under Reg. § 1.1502-80(c) , subsidiary stock is not treated as worthless under Code Sec. 165 until immediately before the earlier of the time: (1) the stock is worthless within the meaning of Reg. § 1.1502-19(c)(1)(iii) ; or (2) the subsidiary for any reason ceases to be a member of the group. Under Code Sec. 582(c) , the sale or exchange of a bond, debenture, note, certificate, or other evidence of indebtedness by financial institutions (including banks) will generally result in ordinary gain or loss. Worthless stock in an affiliated bank (in which the taxpayer owns at least 80% of each class of stock) gives rise to an ordinary loss deduction if the stock becomes worthless.

Facts. Parent and its domestic corporate subsidiaries are members of an affiliated group of corporations that has historically filed a U.S. consolidated federal income tax return. Parent is a S&L company, and the subsidiary at issue (Sub), in which Parent owns all outstanding stock, operated as a federally chartered savings bank and was Parent's principal operating subsidiary. Parent and one of its non-banking subsidiaries (bankrupt subsidiary) filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy on Date 1. The bankruptcy filing was precipitated by the seizure of Sub by the Office of Thrift Supervision and placement into a receivership with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) on Date 2, immediately followed by a receivership sale of substantially all of Sub's assets.

The FDIC, as receiver, continues to act on Sub's behalf and holds Sub's remaining assets (including the sale proceeds). The receivership sale was a taxable transaction in which a separate entity purchased substantially all of Sub's assets and assumed all of its the deposits and certain other liabilities. Sub also had unassumed debt liabilities, and parent's group reported a net loss on its consolidated tax return with respect to the sale.

Since the sale, Sub's assets have principally consisted of the cash proceeds, some amount of which has been invested in marketable securities, and certain intercompany claims and other causes of action. On Date 3, Parent and its bankrupt subsidiary filed a proposed plan of reorganization under chapter 11. The plan is premised on the Bankruptcy Court's approval of a proposed settlement agreement resolving numerous disputes among Parent and its bankrupt subsidiary, the corporation that purchased substantially all of Sub's assets, and the FDIC.

The existing outstanding stock of Parent will be cancelled on the effective date of the plan, and it is currently contemplated that new common shares of reorganized Parent will be issued to certain claimholders. The plan also provides for the establishment of a liquidating trust. At the time that the private letter ruling (PLR) was issued, ignoring any possible recovery on the receiver's claims, the outstanding debt of Sub exceeds its assets, and Sub is expected to remain insolvent.

Parent has an adjusted tax basis in its Sub stock of at least an undisclosed amount, Sub continues to be a member of Parent's group, and Parent has not claimed a worthless stock deduction with respect to the Sub stock under Reg. § 1.1502-80(c) .

Parent expects to recognize its loss from its Sub stock no later than the cancellation of such stock upon the winding-up of the Sub receivership. But, Parent may seek to abandon its stock interest in Sub at an earlier time, in which case Parent will recognize the loss at the time of abandonment. Conclusion. IRS determined that, provided all the requirements for claiming a worthless securities deduction are met,

Parent may claim an ordinary loss for its basis in Sub's stock. Parent represented that the stock would be worthless under Code Sec. 165(g)(1) at the time specified in Reg. § 1.1502-80(c) , and IRS concluded that Parent met the affiliation requirements under Code Sec. 165(g)(3) where it satisfied both the ownership test and the gross receipts test.

The ownership test was readily met based on facts that (i) Parent directly owned all of the stock in Sub, (ii) Parent didn't elect under Reg. § 1.597-4(g) to disaffiliate Sub, and (iii) Sub would continue to be an affiliate until it was liquidated or until Parent abandoned its stock. IRS then examined the language and legislative history of Code Sec. 165(g)(3)(B) and determined that the interest on and gains from the sale of Sub's real estate and consumer loans were active receipts for purposes of applying the gross receipts test. IRS reasoned that the gross receipts test was intended to be a mechanism for determining whether a subsidiary is an operating company (for which an ordinary loss may be allowed) or a holding company (for which no ordinary loss is allowed), and Sub was clearly an operating company that performed significant services in conjunction with the banking transactions that yielded interest income and gain. IRS found that the legislative history of Code Sec. 582(c) further indicates that, for operating banks, gains from transactions involving items of indebtedness are more appropriately treated as yielding ordinary income since these items are akin to inventory or stock items. Thus, IRS reasoned that such gains from such transactions shouldn't be treated as passive for purposes of Code Sec. 165(g)(3)(B) . § 165 Losses.

Parent has until last day of Tax YEAR 2012 to realize the Ordinary Loss on the Books of the WMIH

Until then... WE WAIT !!! Sorry it was so long, but it is important that we look ahead and not back.

~Don~