Rumores de que Grecia volvería al Dracma en 2012
No tengaís muchos euros en vuestras carteras...
Vamos a ser mucho más pobres...(devalucíón inminente de la eurozona) por quitas.
No tengaís muchos euros en vuestras carteras...
Vamos a ser mucho más pobres...(devalucíón inminente de la eurozona) por quitas.
Cada vez que entro tienes una catástrofe nueva,como aciertes esto va a ser la ecatombe.
Y yo firmando El estirón en el Popular....
Enola,
Al margen de que ya seas un reconocido apocaliptico en el foro (cosa que no me preocupa nada, cada uno expresa sus opiniones libremente) creo que si das un grito de alarma podrias elaborar un poquito más. Si no debemos tener euros en nuestros bolsillos, donde debemos tenerlos? o si lo que quieres decir es que no debemos tener euros, qué debemos tener? Ambas apreciaciones dotarian de contenido tu post y seguro que llevaria a una discusion mucho mas fructifera.
Saludos
T.
The loudest warning to date. From Reuters:
•EU Commissioner Damanaki says Greece's Eurozone membership is at risk
•EU Commissioner Damanaki says Greece must agree on tough measures or return to Drachma, according to state news agency
Incidentally, Greece would like nothing more than to return to the Drachma. And here are the next steps...
1.More austerity promises,
2.No actual enactment,
3.Many more violent demonstrations
4.Much more EU disappointment,
5.More cash demands by Athens,
6.EU floats proposal to collateralize DIP loan with Greek gold
7.Greece agrees
8.Greece files for bankruptcy as IMF/EU/ECB cuts off funding
9.Greek gold now held by "developed world"
10.The End
Greece: What Would Happen If it Defaulted? according to the WSJ and Moody's
MARKET COMMENTARY
Moody’s: Moody’s Investors Service has explored possible Greek default scenarios in order to assess the impact on the country’s sovereign rating, the consequences for Greek banks and the possible paths of credit contagion to other European sovereigns, which are discussed in a Special Comment published today.
Moody’s: Moody’s did not comment on the likelihood or the desirability of a debt restructuring, but focused more narrowly on some of the credit implications of different default scenarios.
Moody’s: It is apparent that the longer the current state of uncertainty affecting Greece persists, the greater the temptation on the part of both the Greek and the euro area authorities to try to undertake some form of debt restructuring – in other words, to allow Greece to default. A Greek default might take many forms, including changes in terms and conditions, selective “re-profiling” and large-scale “voluntary” debt buybacks at high discounts, which Moody’s classifies as distressed exchanges.
Moody’s: Moody’s believes that a default is likely to have adverse credit rating implications for Greece, possibly some other stressed European sovereigns, and the Greek banks, regardless of the efforts made to achieve an “orderly” outcome. The full impact on Europe’s capital markets would be hard to predict and harder still to control. The fallout would have implications for the creditworthiness (and hence the ratings) of issuers across Europe.
Moody’s: The impact on the Greek government’s creditworthiness itself would depend on the extent to which a default would – by lowering the face value of outstanding debt – improve the affordability of the country’s debt obligations. A default would most likely cause Greece’s rating to migrate down to Ca or C and remain in the Ca and Caa territory for a sustained period following a default, barring the unlikely event that the resulting debt reduction is so great that the risk of a second default becomes quite low.
Moody’s: The Greek banking sector would require recapitalizing to offset banks’ losses on Greek government bonds, and continued liquidity support from the European Central Bank, at least for as long as the sovereign’s own access to the capital markets remained impaired. Should that support be forthcoming, then the Greek banks’ ratings could stay in the B range. A more likely scenario is that a sovereign default is accompanied by some form of default on bank debt, in which case banks would also experience multi-notch downgrades, quite possibly to as low as Greece’s own rating.
Moody’s: As for other stressed European sovereigns, Moody’s believes that their ratings will invariably be affected, regardless of the myriad forms that a default by Greece could take. This would in turn lead to increasingly polarized sovereign ratings in Europe, with stronger countries retaining high or very high ratings, and weaker countries struggling to remain in investment grade.
http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2011/05/24/greece-what-would-happen-if-it-defaulted/
Edito, que ya has aportado información. Como al final tengas razón en todo lo que dices esto se va a pique.
Como Damanaki suena a griego, y como la noticia parece extraña viniendo de un griego, me he mirado quien es.
María Damanaki era líder del partido comunista griego al estilo IU, pero tras un fracaso electoral al estilo IU la quitaron de líder. Después volvió al parlamento tras las siguientes elecciones, pero tras pelearse con el líder de su partido al estilo IU, se pasó al PASOK, también al estilo IU. Todo queda en la izquierda. Papandreu la ha premiado con una comisión europea.
¿Por qué una transfuga radical de izquierdas que le debe el cargo al actual gobierno de izquierdas griego lanzaría amenazas de que si no se toman medidas extremas contra la población griega les espera la vuelta al Drachma?
Sinceramente creo que no se puede caer más bajo que esta señora, que tan pronto vende a su partido como a su pueblo, siempre en interés propio.
CREDIBILIDAD CERO. Es una manifestación para consumo interno griego para ver si la izquierda radical se traga la nueva bofetada que les van a sacudir, y no incendia la sede del gobierno.
Blog: Game over?