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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños

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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños
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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños
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#18921

Re: Comunes subiendo

Te das cuenta que cerre los cortos el dia adecuado, a partir de ahora puedes llamarme Maestro Besugo.

#18922

Re: Comunes subiendo

Te lo llamare el día que sepas abrirlo cuando haya que ponerse largo.
Como no lo has hecho aun te queda pequeño saltamontes... :)

#18923

Re: Comunes subiendo

No he abierto largos ya dije porque, esta en unos niveles que te la pueden subir un 30% y bajarlo seguidamente un 50% y te quedas con cara de tonto con el mareo y por debajo de tu precio de compra. Otra cosa es abrirlos para ganar en el intradia el porcentaje indicado o menos pero mis cortos y largos son de dias, cuando aciertas das el pleno.
H´s bajando un 5%, la manipulacion es total, hay que tener bemoles para estar en estas acciones, puedes doblar pero tambien puedes perderlo todo.
Fdo. Maestro Guru Buda Besugo.

#18924

La próxima batalla ... 21 marzo

Analisis de Patience360:

Based on EC and Black Horse objections, I believe that the next major battle will be centered on the reorganized debtor -WMMRC, for the following reasons: (1) the court is well aware the fact that WMMRC is undervalued. She pointed out in her (1/7) Opinions a number of deficiencies in debtor’s valuation of WMMRC. It’s also my impression that she has doubts not just about debtors’ valuation, but their motives. (2) There are sizable NOLs available to the reorganized debtor, whether in the amount of $5.5B or in $17.8B. The court in no vague terms recognized at least $5+B might be available to WMMRC in the Opinions too. (She in fact facilitated the $5B NOLs to become reality by delaying her decision on POR in late 2010). (3) Recent revelation by EC via 2004 discovery that “multiple post petition expressions of interest” in WMMRC further confirmed that the reorganized debtor may have greater value than the debtors want the court and others to believe (Debtors Response contradicts EC statement. This just adds more reasons for thorough valuation cross-examinations). (4) The court ordered investigation of WMMRC valuation along with investigation of insider trading by SNH on 2/8. At 2/8 court hearing, the court indicated that “Well, let me posit this. The valuation comes back that the reorganized debtor is worth ten billion dollars. Isn't that something I have to take into consideration when I determine who is getting the equity in that entity and whether or not those creditors are receiving more than they're entitled to under the plan?” Obviously, the court was using a hypothetical figure ($10B) and posing a hypothetical question to SNH lawyers. But the court’s intent of fair distribution and equitable treatment of all involved parties (not just creditors) is clear, at least to this observer. (5) There are rooms for the court to apply FJR instead of default contract rate, which can also open the door for the equity to participate in WMMRC (or, as Black Horse suggested to use the fund from FJR to pay off Piers in full and install preferreds to be the owner of WMMRC.) For now, there is no guaranty that the court will apply FJR (as my understanding, there is a fair chance in BK that judges usually won’t). However, if the allegation of insider trading is proved through 2004 discovery, the application of FJR is most likely a sure thing. In this scenario, the attempt by the debtors/SNH to keep the equity away from WMMRC and grab the reorganized debtor for SNH will be further undermined, or even completely busted.

I am now starting to see what EC recent strategy since Dec. hearing look like. If we make comparisons between EC objection (11/19/2010) and its current objection (03/09), we can see that the 11/19 objection focused on “Releases” while addressing other issues more or less generally. As I said at that time (even earlier when ER came out on 11/01) that the Releases was the one issue that ER, EC, and Court can all agree upon, and therefore an easy and better field to explore effectively. EC clearly saw the Releases was one of the key issues that could shoot the POR down, and that was exactly what happened. The court agreed. Her denial order (to POR confirmation) was determined largely because of the illegality of overly expansive features of the Releases.

The Releases helped us stop the POR (for the time being), and the court left the field open for future law suits against JPMC and FDIC. However, with no organization and strong funding, it’s not impossible but very difficult for retail shareholders to fight costly and time-consuming legal battles against financial power houses and government entities. Both JPMC and FDIC know that. Sure, they want Releases. But the third party releases, in my view, are not much a threat or leverage to them for now. They continue to go along with the debtors and GSA.

continue ...

#18925

Re: La próxima batalla ... 21 marzo

In 03/09 objection, while covering Releases, interest rate, Piers, voting mechanism, EC existence post confirmation, and other issues, it seems to me that EC shifted its focus on valuation and taking control of WMMRC, as demonstrated by the preliminary statement, along with recent, behind scene activities involving insider trading investigation and court-ordered valuation of WMMRC. Black Horse motion (and suggestions) shed some additional lights on WMMRC solution and lend a hand in EC’s efforts too. In my view, this development is significant (I believe it started even earlier, see SS 10/2010 billing, and evolved ever since.) While keeping the GSA appeal alive in District Court, it is smart strategy for EC, meanwhile, to seek out and take advantage of our agreements with the court on some key issues. As noted above, we have a good deal of agreements with the court on WMMRC. For instance, we both agree (1) WMMRC is undervalued; (2) there are at least $5B NOLs available; (3) investigation of WMMRC valuation is needed (and is ongoing as we speak); (4) for the court hypothetical question if WMMRC is worth much more than the debtors’ valuation, “Isn't that something I have to take into consideration when I determine who is getting the equity in that entity and whether or not those creditors are receiving more than they're entitled to under the plan?” we agree whole-heartedly; (5) if proved, insider trading must suffer consequences. Its impact on WMMRC ownership makeup will be up to the court judgment.

We have multiple shots at either participating in or even taking control of the reorganized debtor. I think by focusing on WMMRC, EC is also trying to add teeth to the Releases. We have the Release issue on our side, but we need the vehicle to deliver the goods (leverage). WMMRC is the key. With an established organization and solid financial resources, shareholders can become a real threat to JPMC and FDIC. So far, both JPMC and FDIC have escaped from direct shareholder attack and hidden behind GSA coalition walls. The court admitted she may not have the jurisdiction over some issues regarding both entities. Moreover, it’s the debtors who decided to willingly surrender to JPMC and FDIC. The court can’t stop it as long as the agreements among them satisfy the bankruptcy norm and “lowest point in the range of reasonableness” barring proven frauds or willful misconducts. However, if the equity is able to wrestle away WMMRC from debtors and SNH, shareholders will have ways and means, as well as strong resolve to carry on the fights against JPMC and FDIC in DC or anywhere for as long as we want.

As I said, we have some good shots at WMMRC. As time goes by and more assets are discovered and added to WMMRC, the prospect described above will become clearer and more credible even to our adversaries. In such scenario, it’s like JPMC and FDIC will get sued all over again (of course by equities this time). The releases signed off among GSA parties to one another will become worthless. The current GSA will suddenly look less valuable and attractive to JPMC and FDIC. Even the debtors will become less of use or value to them either. The prospect of facing angry, hostile shareholders who are in control of a well funded, viable business organization and armed with hundreds of damaging documents in court rooms does not look good for JPMC and FDIC. If our fights on WMMRC gain traction with the court, the GSAs will be forced to sit down with EC, and discuss considerations to the equities. The third party release as a bargaining vehicle and leverage will become more relevant in a realistic way.

No doubt, the debtors will fight hard to keep WMMRC away from the equity. They will continue to hide the assets, distort the valuation, and play voting tricks and rights offering games. The outcome of the battle remains to be seen.

One last observation, don’t underestimate this court and Susman team.

By the way, I’m not worried about 3/21 DS hearing. If we win, I’m happy. If it (DS) gets approved, I’ll not lose sleep over it, knowing where our main battle fields are.

#18926

Re: Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños

este hilo es impresionante... llegará el 2015 y seguiréis en él! ;)

#18927

Mucha suerte a todos en este día señalado

Ojala hoy la Juez nos de alguna de nuestras peticiones FJR, Insider...

#18928

Re: Mucha suerte a todos en este día señalado

tic tac otro gran día, con esta juez corrupta y con un Susman que no aparece desde que la juez se rió en su cara, ya se sabe como acabará...

saludos