Wirecard ¿fraude contable o acoso periodístico?

TCI Management se pone corto ante el informe de KPMG desvelando que no ha podido encontrar rastro de los ingresos de los que el Financial Times le acusaba. Aquí la tesis. 

 

Dear Mr Eichelmann, Audit of Wirecard by KPMG More than six months ago, Wirecard mandated KPMG to conduct a special audit to investigate allegations raised by the Financial Times around Wirecard’s Third Party Acquiring business (TPA), which historically represented a significant portion of Wirecard’s revenues and profits [p. 15 KPMG Report]. After several delays to the initial deadline, KPMG today concluded in its final report that it has been unable to verify the revenue booked with these TPA partners in the investigation period of 2016 to 2018 [p. 12 KPMG Report]. KPMG explains that it has encountered an “Untersuchungshemmnis” (in English: obstacles to the investigation).

KPMG was also unable to verify cash payments amounting to €1 billion that TPA partners supposedly paid into “trustee accounts” on behalf of Wirecard [p. 16 KPMG Report]. We understand that these cash balances are included in Wirecard’s consolidated cash balance [p. 13f KPMG Report]. This compares to only €85 million of cash payments during the investigation period that were made by TPA partners to bank accounts held by Wirecard [p. 18 KPMG Report].

Neither was KPMG able to verify the beneficial owner of EMIF and could therefore not opine on the legitimacy of the purchase of Hermes in India [p. 50 KPMG Report]. It is our view that the beneficial owner of EMIF should have been determined as part of Wirecard’s legal due diligence in order to comply with applicable anti-money laundering laws. If KPMG was unable to obtain standard information that it requested from Wirecard such as bank statements, customer names and contracts as well as transaction data [p. 13 KPMG Report] after a 2 lengthy forensic investigation, then in our view this raises questions as to how investors, lenders and regulators can be confident that Wirecard’s current and historic accounting is accurate. Wirecard operates a banking license in Europe and is strictly regulated as a payments service provider; in our view it has to abide by applicable Know Your Customer and anti-money laundering laws.

This raises questions as to how it is possible to comply with these regulations if Wirecard either does not know or will not disclose who its customers are. KPMG further complained about a lack of cooperation from Wirecard’s TPA partners to provide customer and transaction data [p. 13 KPMG Report]. Moreover, Wirecard did not provide KPMG with certain requested documents or only provided them with delay, and KPMG complained that arranged meetings with key executives of Wirecard were repeatedly cancelled and postponed [p. 10 KPMG Report]. KPMG further explains that the supervisory board received regular updates on the progress of the investigation [p. 6 KPMG Report]. Hence, we assume that the supervisory board was well aware of the difficulties KPMG encountered in properly conducting the audit. Given the allegations raised against Wirecard and its executive team by various whistleblowers and newspapers, it could not be more obvious that there is a need to take measures to avoid the likely conflict of interest whereby management supervises an audit of their own actions.


Given this situation, why did you and the supervisory board not intervene when it became clear that the audit could not be properly completed? In our view, it is clearly now necessary for the supervisory board to take direct responsibility for this investigation immediately and to resolve the outstanding questions that the report has failed to answer. In fact, we are advised that the supervisory board has a legal duty of care (Sorgfaltspflicht) that requires it to intervene in these circumstances. In accordance with Section 84 (3) of the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz), the supervisory board also may revoke the appointment of a member of the management board. We are further advised that the supervisory board, as a corporate body as well as every single member of the supervisory board, has wide reaching legal obligations (fiduciary duties) to control and oversee the actions of the management board (Kontroll- und Überwachungsorgan). In circumstances such as these, where Wirecard’s management did not provide KPMG with the necessary documentation to verify TPA revenues in the period of 2016 to 2018 and to verify cash balances amounting to €1 billion in “trustee accounts”, we are of the view that the supervisory board is legally obliged to intervene.

 In our opinion, the necessary intervention is now to remove the CEO from all management duties. If the supervisory board does not remove the CEO, at the very least, they must directly take responsibility for the investigation and remove Wirecard’s management from all involvement in this 3 audit until all of the allegations have been fully resolved. In our view, this is the only way to get to the bottom of the allegations that continue to be unresolved. Otherwise, in our opinion, the supervisory board commits a breach of duty of care for which its members are liable to the company pursuant to Sections 116 and 93 of the German Stock Corporation Act. Such a breach of duty of care can also amount to a failure to take necessary measures to prevent or limit damage. For full disclosure, funds managed by TCI Fund Management Limited submitted in compliance with their disclosure duties to the German Supervisory Authority (BaFin) and published in the Federal Gazette on 28 April 2020 a short position in Wirecard’s stock, equivalent to 1.04% of shares outstanding. 

Huele a pufo, igual alguien ha metido mano en la caja y trataban de ocultarlo. CEO dimisión y luego a prisión !!

Pues duro palo hoy en bolsa

Bueno, supongo que Financial Times será el mensajero, ya que veo que el auditor de EY dice que faltan 2.000k y el de KPMG que faltan documentos  entre 2016-2018.

 

Fráncfort (Alemania), 18 jun (EFE).- La compañía de servicios de pago electrónico Wirecard se ha desplomado en bolsa un 61,8 % después de volver a posponer la publicación del balance de 2019, debido a la falta de claridad respecto a cantidades de miles de millones.

Las acciones de Wirecard cayeron al cierre de la negociación en la Bolsa de Fráncfort un 61,8 %, hasta 39,90 euros.

En algunos momentos llegaron a perder algo más de un 70 %, hasta 35 euros, aunque después redujeron las pérdidas.

Wirecard ha sido acusada de irregularidades contables en Asia y de blanqueo de dinero y sólo había presentado algunas cifras preliminares del balance del año pasado.

En algunos momentos se interrumpió la negociación de las acciones de Wirecard, que hoy iba a presentar el balance completo, en la sesión matinal de la Bolsa de Fráncfort.

La auditora EY ha informado a Wirecard sobre la existencia de haberes bancarios en cuentas fiduciarias por valor de 1.900 millones de euros, sobre los que no existen comprobaciones suficientes.

La auditora KPMG también dijo a finales de abril que faltaban documentos de los años 2016 y hasta 2018, principalmente respecto a negocios con otras empresas.

Por ello, KPMG no pudo determinar si las cifras de facturación eran reales.

Si Wirecard no presenta hasta el viernes un balance testado, algunos bancos podrían retirarle créditos de hasta más de 2.000 millones de euros.

En caso en que las acciones de Wirecard sigan bajando tanto en bolsa como los últimos meses, podría dejar de cotizar en el selectivo de Fráncfort, el DAX 30, en el que entró en septiembre de 2018 en sustitución de Commerzbank.

Deutsche Börse, gestor de la Bolsa de Fráncfort, también va a estudiar emprender un procedimiento de sanción por no presentar las cuentas definitivas, obligación que tienen todas las empresas que cotizan en el DAX 30.

Según cifras provisionales, publicadas hoy, Wirecard incrementó en 2019 el beneficio neto hasta 482 millones de euros (+39 %) y la facturación hasta 2.800 millones de euros (+37,5 %).

La Fiscalía de Múnich ha dicho que va a realizar investigaciones sobre Wirecard, algo que hacen desde hace tiempo las autoridades de supervisión financiera BaFin.

Por un lado, la Fiscalía va a investigar si Wirecard ha sufrido ataques especulativos en bolsa y, por otro, si su dirección ha dado información confusa a los inversores sobre sus cuentas.

(c) Agencia EFE 

estos temas son bastantes alucinantes. Lo que iba contando el FT tenía visos de ser cierto. Y el mercado mirando para otro lado. Filiales/asociados en países árabes que no se sabe qué hacen con el dinero y que inflan los ingresos. Con NMC Health, que  también ha habido fraude, también hay invesores árabes por el medio.

Es como lo de Luckin Coffee: el informe que salió en enero del corto que habían pasado miles de horas vigilando las ventas en los establecimientos y recogiendo tickets, al final se demostró un par de meses más tarde que era cierto que estaban inflando ingresos y gastos porque el mercado solo estaba valorando el crecimiento de la empresa (aunque movían el dinero circularmente de manera distinta a la hipótesis que planteó el que sacó el informe).

E igualmente, es como lo de General Electric: sacaron el informe sobre el agujero que tienen en los seguros para mayores, super-documentado y un trabajo de recopilación y análisis exhaustivo, y no se hizo ni caso. La empresa solo dio excusas vagas. Imagino que creerán que lo van a ir tapando con el dinero que generan en sus otras líneas de negocio, pero tal como se ha puesto el tema de los aviones, probablemente acabe estallando antes de lo que pensaban.

Si las acusaciones no fueran verdad, no hubieran retrasado la presentación de resultados tropecientas veces. Sea o no sea verdad, lo que está claro es que el management de la empresa es un desastre y, por tanto, hay que estar fuera de este valor, por mucho futuro que tenga el sector en el que realiza su actividad.

Pues hoy ya abre con un -45%

Aquí el comunicado que han lanzado hoy: 

Wirecard AG / Key word(s): Profit Warning/Miscellaneous

The Management Board of Wirecard assesses on the basis of further examination that there is a prevailing likelihood that the bank trust account balances in the amount of 1.9 billion EUR do not exist. 

The company previously assumed that these trust accounts have been established for the benefit of the company in connection with the so called Third Party Acquiring business and has reported them as an asset in its financial accounts. The foregoing also causes the company to question the previous assumptions regarding the reliability of the trustee relationships.

The Management Board further assesses that previous descriptions of the so called Third Party Acquiring business by the company are not correct. 

The Company continues to examine, whether, in which manner and to what extent such business has actually been conducted for the benefit of the company.Wirecard withdraws the assessment of (i) the preliminary results of the financial year 2019 (revenue and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA)) of 14 February 2020 (last confirmed on 18 June 2020), (ii) the preliminary results of the first quarter of 2020 (revenue and EBITDA) of 14 May 2020, (iii) the EBITDA prognosis for the financial year 2020 of 6 November 2019 (last confirmed on 14 May 2020) and (iv) the Vision 2025 prognosis for the financial year 2025 on transaction volume, revenue and EBITDA of 8 October 2019. Potential effects on the annual financial accounts of previous years cannot be excluded.

Wirecard continues to be in constructive discussions with its lending banks with regard to the continuation of credit lines and the further business relationship, including the continuation of the current drawing coming due at the end of June. 

Together with the renowned and internationally active investment bank Houlihan Lokey, Wirecard is assessing options for a sustainable financing strategy for the company.In addition, the Company is examining a broad range of possible further measures to ensure continuation of its business operations, including cost reductions as well as restructuring, disposal or termination of business units and products segments.

For the avoidance of misunderstandings, the company wishes to inform that its IT systems continue to work without limitations.

inviértelos mejor en Valaris, tienes más probabilidad (aunque muy pequeña también) de pegar un pelotazo.

Wirecard tiene el peligro de ser el nuevo gowex... mejor mantenerse alejado, o al menos no dejar abiertas operaciones, no vaya a ser que al siguiente dia la suspendan y deje de cotizar.

Me paso con Popular y thomas cook, aunque los motivos no mantienen relación alguna con el caso wirecard, de los errores se aprende

"WIRECARD se declara insolvente y se convierte en el primer miembro del DAX en colapsar".

 
https://serenitymarkets.com/uncategorized/wirecard-se-declara-insolvente-y-se-convierte-en-el-primer-miembro-del-dax-en-colapsar/