"This is simply a bankruptcy case," but it is not a "simple" bankruptcy case, thereby keeping the threat of subsequent consequences (civil, criminal, professional sanction, court sanction and fine) open; especially if the immunity provisions of the GSA-based POR/DS 5th do not survive.
1. It is the largest bank/thrift bankruptcy in history.
2. It includes a government arranged seizure, with disputes between two regulators, OTS and FDIC as to basis of the need for such seizure.
3. It includes a sale {objectionable language} of assets that it did not identify as seized.
4. It includes the sale to the largest institutional bank, with a long-term relationship with the U.S. government; and the assets sold are not identified.
5. It includes allegations that the U.S. Treasury, with influence from the FED, made the call to seize in order to spur the passage of legislation by Congress, TARP; for political purposes.
6. It includes representation {objectionable language} of the debtor by the largest and most prominent NY bankruptcy law firm, that in precedent setting open court admission, conducts actions and states that the interest of the debtor "does not include creditors *and any residual interest to equity."
7. It includes representation by such debtor counsel, even though such counsel openly admitted conflict of interest with the acquiring bank, the largest private adversarial {in name only} party.
8. It includes representation by other counsel of the bank adversary, while such other counsel represented the largest US investment bank in structuring $4B worth of hybrid TPS for the debtor; without open admission of conflict of interest.
9. It includes representation by other counsel of the bank adversary in consultation on the purchase of the debtor’s assets, while such other counsel represented the debtor in a successor lawsuit and had been awarded under $400M several months prior to such advice to bank adversary and while the award was on appeal.
10. It includes conflicts counsel with regard to the debtor counsel, with an openly admitted court previous bankruptcy case reference to unwillingness to take action against the same debtor counsel for conflict violations.
11. It includes counsel at various positions with a reported record of inappropriate fees of substantive amounts in previous bankruptcy cases.
12. It includes actions conducted for the debtor undertaken via various positions of financial, risk and market management senior positions, by employees that, within recent years, previously were employed by the bank adversary.
13. It includes documents discovered that indicated that the bank adversary intended for months to acquire the debtor by means of and via government seizure.
14. It includes a former member of the Board of Directors, a Mayor of a major US city, receiving for the benefit of the city a $3M contribution from the bank adversary shortly after resigning from the debtor’s Board of Directors while in bankruptcy. Of note, the Mayor’s campaign manager was the regional director for the bank adversary.
15. It includes government attorneys from the Department of Justice leaving public service and joining the debtor counsel.
16. It includes government officials with proximity to the seizure and sale joining the bank adversary.
17. It includes the debtors top risk manager, the risk operation referred to by a Senate panel as generally fatal, subsequently joins the FHLB, as the risk manager.
18. It includes the debtor’s long-term top sub-prime manager; see risk reference by Senate panel, subsequently joining the bank adversary.
19. It includes assets sold valuations seized without compensation from the debtor to be sold to the bank adversary which, despite attempts to write down the loan portfolio by $29B, still recognizes over $10B of original negative goodwill on its SEC filed annual report.
20. It includes NOL carryback and open year adjustment refunds of $6B and tax benefit carryforwards of at least $6B {not discounted} belonging to the debtor as assets of the estate but not recorded by contract management based upon an unapproved GSA.
21. It includes a DS that is silent the disclosure of all tax assets of the estate available from the tax benefit carryforwards.
22. It includes a DS that is silent the disclosure of a $550M final settlement from the US government accruing to the debtor’s estate via a previously acquired bank and subject to certain warrant claims.
23. It includes an overheard statement by the conflicts counsel to the debtor with regard to the bank adversary, prior to the surprise announcement {to such conflicts counsel also} of the GSA, after returning to his seat with his firm members “we gave up,” while the lead debtor counsel and the bank adversary counsel broadly smiled.
24. It includes the redistribution of $40-$100B of direct and indirect wealth from the Pacific Northwest to NY.
25. It includes the redistribution of untold billions of wealth from retail investors to large investment banks, hedge funds and the bank adversary “club.”
26. It, the entire bankruptcy, appears to at least one casual observer, to be merely a game to the debtor and debtor counsel, the bank adversary and the government agency.
27. It is not a game when someone died.
28. Hundreds, possibly thousands of retail investors band together with one voice, shining one light.
29. They have won the formation of an Equity Committee (EC Counsel and financial advisors) and it has resulted in the appointment of an Examiner, a brighter light.
30. The consequences, referred to at the beginning, haven’t even begun to feel the burn of the disinfectant from the true and full sunlight.