Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños

Sinceramente este Simpson no se de que va, enredando a todo Cristo viviente que se cree sus bombeos, lamentable.

que no besugo, que las preferentes FACE VALUE, je,je,je, a ver lo que casca ahora el simpsoriano,je,je.

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229110713000000000012.pdf

 In the EC's objection to the POR which became public yesterday, the EC makes two demands which have the potential to reduce the estate's liabilities in a big way. These are:
(1) disallowing the hedgies bond claims altogether via equitable disallowance.
(2) paying postpetition interest on bonds at FJR rather than contract rate (coupon);

Equitable Disallowance:
From the EC's objection:
Quote

II. Settlement Note Holders' Claims Should Be Disallowed Due To Their Misuse Of Confidential Information Obtained In The Bankruptcy.
38. The Plan is objectionable to the extent it provides for allowance of Aurelius's and Centerbridge' claims because they used their strategic position in these cases to trade on material non-public information provided to them in confidence by the Debtors. Soon after filing this Objection, the Equity Committee will file an adversary action to equitably disallow the Settlement Note Holders' claims. To the extent the Settlement Note Holders' claims are disallowed,the Plan must further provide that distribution of the disallowed amounts will be made to the Debtors' other creditors and interest holders, including equity holders in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code.

Quote
E. Equity Holders Have Been Directly Harmed By The Inequitable Conduct.
62. The evidence at trial will show that the equity holders were harmed in several direct ways by Aurelius' and Centerbridge's conduct, including that the delay caused by their conduct cost the estate tens of millions of dollars in interest and administrative fees and that they deprived the Debtors of a corporate opportunity that, if used, could have saved the estate tens of millions of dollars in payments. In addition, Aurelius and Centerbridge helped cause the Debtors to adopt a plan of reorganization that gives nothing to equity, in spite of the large returns possible.
63. To remedy their conduct, their profits from buying and selling securities in this case should be disallowed and disgorged. In addition, they should be required to pay the estate for the interest and administrative fees caused by the delay their conduct brought on.

Some things are not clear. The EC says it "will file an adversary action to equitably disallow the Settlement Note Holders' claims", but many of the specifics refer only to Aurelius and Centerbridge. Also, the EC says "their profits from buying and selling securities in this case should be disallowed and disgorged", but does this mean just the profits or their entire bond-related claims?

Under the assumptions that (1) only Aurelius and Centerbridge are targeted for the disallowance, and (2) the disallowance will target their entire claims, a calculation can be made as to how much the liabilities of WMI would be reduced if this disallowance were to be granted. Reducing the liabilities means less $ required to fill up the waterfall above equity. From a 10/5/10 filing related to the prior confirmation, here are the bond holdings of these two hedge funds (seniors, subs, PIERs):
Centerbridge: total $344M ($0, $275M, $69M)
Aurelius: total $417M ($78M, $210M, $129M)
Total for disallowance: $761M

FJR vs CR:
From the EC's objection:
Quote
III. Post-Petition Interest Should Be Paid At The Federal Judgment Rate.
64. Confirmation should be denied because the Plan provides for the payment of post-petition interest calculated at the applicable contract rate or , where no contract exists, calculated at the federal judgment rate plus additional interest on the already accrued post-petition interest (i.e., interest on interest)

68. In the event the Court concludes it does have discretion with respect to the applicable rate of post-petition interest, the facts here compel the conclusion that interest should be calculated at the federal judgment rate.

It is not entirely clear, but the EC seems to be calling for the payment of postpetition interest (PPI) at FJR across the board. Under that assumption, a calculation can be made of the total PPI which would be owed to bondholders, and of the decrease in estate liabilities this would represent. See attached image for spreadsheet calculation; FJR is set at the 0.5% rate in EC's objection.

PPI at contract rates (CR):
- sub bonds: $320M
- senior bonds: $426M
- PIERS: $192M
- total = $938M

PPI at FJR (0.5%):
- sub bonds: $25M
- senior bonds: $62M
- PIERS: $11M
- total = $98M

Thus imposition of FJR (instead of CR) on these three classes of bonds for calculating PPI would reduce the estate's liabilities by $839M.

There is some interaction between FJR and equitable disallowance in calculating a grand total, but a simple summing of the reduction in estate liabilities from both parts gives:
$761M + $839M = $1.600B

That's enough to thoroughly put preferred shares in the money, but does not go all that far in filling up the preferreds pool in the waterfall as it has a ~$7.5B capacity (including TPS).

this isn't scientific, but assume that $1.6B, minus the shortfall to creditors (i'm going to pull $600m out of my ass)..

for convenince's sake, just say WMMRC's got a market cap of $1B
assume $8B in actual benefit from the $23B NOLs is achieved over 20 years

in the case that commons get 50% of the newCo equity, $7.5B of preferred would get $0.5B, should immediately be valued at 6.6 cents on the dollar. after 20 years, owning half of a $9B company, they'd be 60 cents on the dollar.

in the case that P's can satisfy 382(l)5 (way above my pay grade) without common, P's should be immediately valued at 16 cents on the dollar, K's and TPS around 11 cents on the dollar. after 20 years, 150 cents / dollar for P's, 100 cents/ dollar for K's & TPS.

philosophically, i'd like to see P's and common fill that 50% role, to even out the disparity with that side of the 50% split and the K's and TPS. or maybe even K's and TPS turned into new preferreds, leaving the possibility of some sort of stock offering without effecting an ownership change (in additional to further "no change in control" triggering capital raises.

But first creditors have to be crammed down

When these hearings were scheduled, I thought JMW and Rosen agreed to set aside July 13, 14, and 15th.  This morning we had two significant rulings in our favor where the motion in Limine was denied and where Anderson was admitted as an expert witness.  Anderson proved to be a credible witness and laid the groundwork for a favorable NOL evaluation.  The debtor's expert witness came across as not as credible.  All the really potentially embarrassing stuff for the SNH's was put off until the end of the hearing.  Then after lunch we hear that the time table changes and the examination of the IT charges will be put off until the 18th.  My 8-ball take on these changes is the first day did not go as Rosen wished and he realizes the POR #6.5 is not likely to be approved.  He used the lunch hour to lobby JMW for the 2 extra days and then rescheduled the IT discussion so that there was a weekend to explore further settlement talks before any evidence would be put forth on the IT.  I think they would like a settlement but I don't know if they have the cash to pull it off.  The longer this goes on, the stronger our position seems to become.  I suspect SG's asking price goes up with each favorable ruling.

DelShareholder Ilene Slatko
Starke: jurisdiction question? JMW: should I not hear evidence and send findings to DC court?

We know there must be claims that Walrath needs to file a report to the DC forum. But what claims? Obviously, they are not the claims that are related to the WMB equity interests. Guys, we are losing the most valuable litigation claims per the order on July 11. Unless and until the TPS or EC [1] file a motion to withdraw the reference of the order regarding the abandoning the DC litigations concerning the WMB equity interest or [2] are able to "step into the shoes of the debtors upon the debtors' abandonment of litigations arsing from the WMB equity", our hands are tied, very.

3. Our hands are tied. EC could have bidders or lenders waitting outside and being sniping for the chance to introduce their emergency plan. It could be the case, but highly speculative. To me, EC is placing large weight on the Claims Disallowance and Abuse of Bankruptcy Pocoess rather than criticizing the valuation of the debtors. Until we hear from PJSC and the cross, what do I know?

GLTA very.

Finalmente te darás cuenta que sin los debtors, los accionistas no tienen a donde ir por lo que la Juez tiene plena autoridad para CONFIRMAR EL POR en las condiciones actuales volviendo a calificarlo como justo y razonable, ELIMINANDO TODAS LAS ACCIONES.

No se van a eliminar las preferentes estan in the money. En cuanto no se sabe aun