(1) Does this Court have the power to confirm a Plan that incorporates
provisions obviously designed to: (i) invade Chief Judge Sleet’s exclusive
jurisdiction over the TPS Consortium’s appeal in Blackhorse Capital LP v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Adv. No. 10-51387 (MFW), on appeal, Civ.
Action No. 11-124-GWS; and (ii) moot such appeal before Chief Judge
Sleet and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals have had an opportunity to
review the merits? [Answer: No]
Does the Divestiture Rule otherwise 62
obligate the Debtors to modify the Plan, striking those provisions that
advertently or inadvertently hamper the appellate courts’ ability to reverse
and return the parties to the status quo ante, and adding a disputed-claims
reserve to hold the TPS Securities pending ultimate conclusion of the
appellate process? [Answer: Yes]
(2) Following Stern v. Marshall, does this Court have the Constitutional power to issue a final order approving the Global Settlement Agreement (and the Plan, as its bankruptcy “wrapping”), given that: (a) the settlement
involves substantial non-core litigation that otherwise must be adjudicated elsewhere; and (b) the settlement is hotly-contested, resulting in an extended trial over whether it should be forcibly imposed on thousands of
disaffected parties-in-interest? [Answer: No]
Is this Court only
authorized by the Constitution to deliver proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law for Chief Judge Sleet’s final consideration? [Answer: Yes]
(3) In the particular circumstances of this case, can “the legal rate” of postpetition
interest (as those words are used in Bankruptcy Code Section
726(a)(5)) refer to any rate other than the federal judgment rate?
[Answer: No]
If it is the federal judgment rate, can the reference date for
calculating post-petition interest be any date other than the confirmation
date, the most obvious and logical analogue to the date of “judgment” in
federal civil litigation? [Answer: No]
(4) Can the Plan “death-trap” the TPS Consortium’s right to participate in the
proceeds of unsettled estate causes of action without the Debtors providing this Court one iota of evidence proving, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the value of all such causes of action is less than the amount needed for the TPS Securities to be “in-the-money”; and, therefore, (2) that the holders of TPS Securities are not otherwise legally
entitled to any such value? [Answer: No] Absent such evidence, is the Plan “fair and equitable” with respect to the post-consummation
governance of such unsettled estate litigation, given that: (1) the litigation
is controlled by creditor representatives that have absolutely no interest in that litigation; and (2) disaffected holders of TPS Securities are not afforded any right to participate in future litigation governance? [Answer: No]
(5) Does the law allow the Debtors to establish the sufficiency of the Global
Settlement Agreement, covering fact-intensive avoidance and business tort claims exceeding $6 billion, with only pleadings (i.e., absolutely no admissible evidence going to the underlying merits of the claims)?
[Answer: No]
Does the law impose a heightened evidentiary burden on the Debtors in light of: (x) the findings contained in the Senate Report
(including, especially, findings giving strong challenge to any factual 63
contention that the Debtors were solvent pre-petition); (y) the ANICO
reversal (now enabling the business tort claims to proceed); and (z)
substantial new evidence that the Global Settlement was negotiated without any analysis of the value of such claims, by conflicted
professionals that turned a blind eye to such claims to enable the deal to finalize? [Answer: Yes]
(6) Does Bankruptcy Code Section 365(c)(2) prohibit post-petition “completion” of the Conditional Exchange of TPS Securities for WMI
preferred stock that was not issued pre-petition and, today, does not exist?
[Answer: Yes]