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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños

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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños
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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños
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#25626

Re: Jamie Dimon (JPM) tiene cancer de garganta...

Simpson eres un profeta malo, malo, malo.

#25627

WMIH sube controladamente $2.88 (+1.77%)

Cuando estemos a $3 se cumplirá la primera parte de la profecia... la segunda la verás antes de que finalice el año... te adelanto...¡Te va a hacer retorcerte en tu silla! jajajajaja

#25628

Escrows: El Purchase Agreement de la FDIC sigue vivo hasta 25 de Septiembre

1) The Equity Committee has been disbanded.
2) It is the estate that funds the Equity Committee, who in turn, hires council - aka hired Susman Godfrey
3) The WMILT is now the "successor in interest" to the Estate
4) The WMILT is barred from suing any of the 'released parties'
5) The SNHs were released
6) EVEN IF you Unicorn your way past all of the above, then WHO PAYS for the suit -- and the appeals.
So yes, once this matter was settled, the EC disbanded, and the WMILT now the 'estate' -- NO you can't go back and sue.
...Catz

Reply by tanjazielman:
NOW you're making sense! Also Unicorn is not a verb so please don't use it like that. It's confusing enough already.
Since you brought up these points:
Quote:
4) The WMILT is barred from suing any of the 'released parties'
5) The SNHs were released
6) EVEN IF you Unicorn your way past all of the above, then WHO PAYS for the suit -- and the appeals.

These releases are IMO part of a deal. A deal has to be negotiated.
The release of AAOC was not something that they would get for free. And handing over 95% ownership of WMIH for equity didn't cut it either. Not if you have negotiators like Ed Sargent and Mike Willingham at the table.
My opinion is AAOC would give a whole lot more to be rescued from a dangling sword above their heads waiting to fall down at any moment in the future.
EC got a good hand there. Insider trading charges against Hedge Funds with big clients. People would be facing jail time, and their methods would be monitored more strictly on a permanent basis. They would do anything to sweep it under the rug! The releases must be given at all cost!

If one thinks the EC didn't have a strong leverage here, one must be completely oblivious to power play.
The EC was willing to talk (and especially listen) And remember: only Willingham and Sargent sat at the table for the EC!
(Remember Susman & Godfrey's motto: "Trial by agreement")
JPM and FDIC were not present at mediation. WHICH WASN'T NECESSARY BECAUSE THE NEGOTIATION WAS ALL ABOUT THE RELEASE OF AAOC.
Also:
All term sheets are under seal.
PAA is still effective until end of September.
And let's sum up what we have seen so far by the LT:
- Litigating Trust: 20 million used for litigation? No way man! We bring back 12 million, we don't need 20 million... "we're not gonna sue anyone!" Until today that appears to be FACT.
- Depositions and subpoena's of former employees, directors and JPM are postponed until after the life span of WMI LT. Don't believe anyone who tells you the three years can be prolonged with three years. It's not going to happen. Why? It's not necessary!
See the statement above why the LT is not necessary.
- Escrows are not an asset of the WMI LT. It's not on the books, there is no mention of it in the FAQ on wmitrust.com. But the legal definition in a bankruptcy context it is a "legal obligation to distribute assets, mostly money". Whole different beast then an LTI? And who got those? PIERS of course.
- Susman, who takes care of the claims FOR the LT, didn't bill squat.
Also look at the whole bank PAA. The one that is still effective right now. At this very moment. Until this coming september:

"13.12 Term of Agreement. This Agreement shall continue in full force and effect until
the sixth (6th) anniversary of Bank Closing" (which is until 25th of Sept. 2014, ladies and gentlemen)

Which literally STATES what we end up with:
SCHEDULE 3.2 - Purchase Price of Assets
(a) cash and receivables from depository Book Value
institutions, including cash items in the
process of collection, plus
interest thereon:
(b) securities (exclusive of the capital stock of Market Value
Acquired Subsidiares), plus interest
thereon:
(c) federal funds sold and repurchase Book Value
agreements, if any, including interest
thereon:
(d) Loans: Book Value
(e) Other Real Estate: Book Value
(f) credit card business, if any, including all Book Value
outstanding extensions of credit:
(g) Safe Deposit Boxes and related business,
safekeeping business and trust business, if Book Value
any:
(h) Records and other documents: Book Value
(i) capital stock of any Acquired Subsidiares: Book Value
(j) amounts owed to the Failed Ban by any Book Value
Acquired Subsidiary:
(k) assets securing Deposits of public money, Book Value
to the extent not otherwise purchased
hereunder:
(1) Overdrafts of customers: Book Value
(m) rights, if any, with respect to Qualified Market Value
Financial Contracts.
(n) rights of the Failed Ban to provide Book Value
mortgage servicing for others and to have
mortgage servicing provided to the Failed
Ban by others and related contracts.
(0) Bank Premises: Book Value
(p) Furniture and Equipment: Book Value
(q) Fixtures: Book Value
PS. What I forgot to mention was these assets were supposed to go to the SNH's in POR 6 (and POR 5 maybe?). Which was probably in a term sheet between JPM/DFIC and SNH's that was also under seal. But since our collective memory sometimes gets a bit foggy, happy to help refresh it. You are all welcome!
And welcome to comment of course
Withcatz:
tanja -- It's disappointing, but I understand that you believe as such.
Unfortunately, the straight facts - AND THEY ARE FACTS - are right in front of you.
You can believe that "there ought to be a pony in there" -- that's fine.
I just hope you carry a receipt from those who "sold you that pony" and you take it up with them, at the appropriate time (September?)
I know, FOR A FACT, you will not be taking it up with me. Truth and facts are 100% on my side here. It's not nearly as complex (or requiring suspension of law, physics, or even metaphysics) - as some theories require.
No, I don't expect to change your mind. It's made up. No need to confuse it with facts.
You "believe" that there was something "more" there. After all, the theory goes, what we got just can't be all we got. There has to be more. It's just all secret.
I won't sway your opinion from that. Really, I don't think I will.
But I am right.
...Catz

tanjazielman:
Right again!
It's not complex at all:
SNH's got everything listed under 3.2 in PAA in POR 6
SNH: Oops insider trading! Gotta undo this.
EC: Let's negotiate!
Equity's got everything listed under 3.2 in PAA in POR 7 and 95% stake in WMIH's as a nice bonus (most of equity is AAOC property anyway)
Simple cause and effect No mediation needed with FDIC and JPM.
Of course WithCatz replies with the FACT-card and the unnecessary drama again:
I'd be happy, in fact ecstatic, to have some of those 'facts' demonstrated to me.
Show me a docket item (that hasn't been subsequently made moot).
Show me any SEC filing that supports a pony.
Show me any Press Release.
Show me any statement by any member of the EC.
Show me any statement by any of the council.
Sadly, not possible.
So everybody's lying, and that's the "new truth" -- ugh.
Nope.
...Catz

Tanjazielman:
You have a tendency to animalize opposing theories to those of yours as "unicorns" and "ponies". Nice trick! I'm impressed.
Your theories are based on facts that are before our eyes.

Well since you are such a FACTUAL person I have some facts for YOU:
Look at this document (with FACTS):
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/813494/jpmfdic.pdf

What do we see?

EXHIBIT A:
"13.12 Term of Agreement. This Agreement shall continue in full force and effect until the sixth (6th) anniversary of Bank Closing" (That's a fact right?)

What else?

EXHIBIT B:
3.2 Asset Purchase Price.
(a) All Assets and assets of the Failed Bank subject to an option to purchase by the Assuming Bank shall be purchased for the amount, or the amount resulting from the method specified for
deteriming the amount, as specified on Schedule 3.2, except as otherwise may be provided
herein. Any Asset, asset of the Failed Bank subject to an option to purchase or other asset
purchased for which no purchase price is specified on Schedule 3.2 or otherwise herein shall be
purchased at its Book Value. Loans or other assets charged of the Accounting Records of the
Failed Bank prior to the date of Bank Closing shall be purchased at a price of zero

And now to the attachments:

SCHEDULE 3.2 - Purchase Price of Assets
(a) cash and receivables from depository Book Value
institutions, including cash items in the
process of collection, plus
interest thereon:
(b) securities (exclusive of the capital stock of Market Value
Acquired Subsidiares), plus interest
thereon:
(c) federal funds sold and repurchase Book Value
agreements, if any, including interest
thereon:
(d) Loans: Book Value
(e) Other Real Estate: Book Value
(f) credit card business, if any, including all Book Value
outstanding extensions of credit:
(g) Safe Deposit Boxes and related business,
safekeeping business and trust business, if Book Value
any:
(h) Records and other documents: Book Value
(i) capital stock of any Acquired Subsidiares: Book Value
(j) amounts owed to the Failed Ban by any Book Value
Acquired Subsidiary:
(k) assets securing Deposits of public money, Book Value
to the extent not otherwise purchased
hereunder:
(1) Overdrafts of customers: Book Value
(m) rights, if any, with respect to Qualified Market Value
Financial Contracts.
(n) rights of the Failed Ban to provide Book Value
mortgage servicing for others and to have
mortgage servicing provided to the Failed
Ban by others and related contracts.
(0) Bank Premises: Book Value
(p) Furniture and Equipment: Book Value
(q) Fixtures: Book Value

So if we put exhibit A and B together NOTHING HAS BEEN COMPLETELY SOLD YET AND WE ARE OWED AS A FAILED BANK STILL THE PURCHASE PRICE OF THE LISTED ASSETS ON SCHEDULE 3.2

#25629

Re: Escrows: El Purchase Agreement de la FDIC sigue vivo hasta 25 de Septiembre

Simpson deja de meter sabanas y concreta mas que los pocos usuarios que te leen están hasta el moño de tus vaguedades y simplezas diciendo que esto se va a 20 y mas entelequias que solo tu entiendes.
Tienes la cara mas dura que el granito

#25630

Re: Escrows: El Purchase Agreement de la FDIC sigue vivo hasta 25 de Septiembre

Leete este acuerdo que no se ha materializado y tiene fecha 25 Septiembre 2014
No creo que Susman haya dejado de lado a los antiguos accionistas y para finales de Septiembre puede que tengamos las cosas un poco más claras.

http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/813494/jpmfdic.pdf

En concreto esto es lo que se querían quedarse los SNH en el POR 6 y que fue modificado tras las acusaciones de Insider Trading y la intervención de Nate Thoma como accionista. Los Hedge Funds ganaban porque ellos ya eran poseedores de acciones Pre que se convertirian en Escrows así que todo lo que se reciba en el estado tb iria a parar a ellos aparte de las clases Preferentes y Comunes.

EXHIBIT A:
"13.12 Term of Agreement. This Agreement shall continue in full force and effect until the sixth (6th) anniversary of Bank Closing" (That's a fact right?)
What else?
EXHIBIT B:
3.2 Asset Purchase Price.
(a) All Assets and assets of the Failed Bank subject to an option to purchase by the Assuming Bank shall be purchased for the amount, or the amount resulting from the method specified for
deteriming the amount, as specified on Schedule 3.2, except as otherwise may be provided
herein. Any Asset, asset of the Failed Bank subject to an option to purchase or other asset
purchased for which no purchase price is specified on Schedule 3.2 or otherwise herein shall be
purchased at its Book Value. Loans or other assets charged of the Accounting Records of the
Failed Bank prior to the date of Bank Closing shall be purchased at a price of zero
And now to the attachments:
SCHEDULE 3.2 - Purchase Price of Assets
(a) cash and receivables from depository Book Value
institutions, including cash items in the
process of collection, plus
interest thereon:
(b) securities (exclusive of the capital stock of Market Value
Acquired Subsidiares), plus interest
thereon:
(c) federal funds sold and repurchase Book Value
agreements, if any, including interest
thereon:
(d) Loans: Book Value
(e) Other Real Estate: Book Value
(f) credit card business, if any, including all Book Value
outstanding extensions of credit:
(g) Safe Deposit Boxes and related business,
safekeeping business and trust business, if Book Value
any:
(h) Records and other documents: Book Value
(i) capital stock of any Acquired Subsidiares: Book Value
(j) amounts owed to the Failed Ban by any Book Value
Acquired Subsidiary:
(k) assets securing Deposits of public money, Book Value
to the extent not otherwise purchased
hereunder:
(1) Overdrafts of customers: Book Value
(m) rights, if any, with respect to Qualified Market Value
Financial Contracts.
(n) rights of the Failed Ban to provide Book Value
mortgage servicing for others and to have
mortgage servicing provided to the Failed
Ban by others and related contracts.
(0) Bank Premises: Book Value
(p) Furniture and Equipment: Book Value
(q) Fixtures: Book Value

#25631

WMIH: Analisis de Ali Meshkati

• WMIH experienced an uptrend as the stock price continues to move in a relatively narrow
range ahead of what should be announcement of the first merger target before the end of 2014.

What is, perhaps, most impressive about the portfolio's performance in 2014 is the fact that
WMIH is currently and has been the largest position in the portfolios for close to two years
now. In 2014, WMIH is essentially unchanged, meaning that all of our performance has come
from names other than our largest holding, with a majority of the names currently populating
the portfolio being new investments for 2014. It is fair to assume then that the portfolios have a lot of suppressed energy in the front end that should be unleashed sometime over the next several months.

The way I look at our investment in WMIH is from an extremely long-term, time-segmented
standpoint. What I mean by this is that different frames of time will bring different realities and thus different results in terms of overall returns in the investment, as well as volatility.

The first frame that we were in was from July 2012 (inception of investment) until December
2013. That frame entailed almost no execution risk on behalf of management along with a
tremendous value in being able to acquire a mortgage reinsurer with $6 billion in NOLs
attached for what was the equivalent of .10 cents per share ex-cash. By the end of the first frame WMIH had a highly reputable finance partner in KKR onboard in addition to Blackstone
playing an advisory role.

The second frame now involves finding a merger partner, along with detailed financial terms of
how a leveraged merger transaction will take place. In this second frame, there is also very little execution risk on behalf of management, allowing for the stock to experience very little overall volatility with the absence of quarterly earnings or a regular public relations news cycle.

Fortunately, the environment for M&A remains extremely accommodating, with no lack of
capital available to facilitate transactions or candidates searching for a company that will
provide substantial tax savings along with operational expertise in the financial space.
The first two frames have taken two years. We can expect that by the time we are at the 2.5 year mark, we will have an operating entity that will be providing revenues and cash flow, leading us into the third and fourth frames.

The next frames, which will likely take us another 2.5 years (for a total of 5 years invested in WMIH) up to 2017, will involve growth in earnings facilitated by the power of tax efficiency from the NOLs. This will allow further acquisitions to take place that will further accelerate the use of the NOLs, creating tremendous bottom-line results as the company progresses.

The second half of this investment will involve a great deal more volatility as we will be
exposed to a dramatically increased amount of execution risk on behalf of management. They
will be seeking to aggressively grow and reinvest earnings, which will demand a great deal
more transparency. At the same time, proper execution of the strategy can very easily turn
WMIH into a multi-billion dollar financial company in the coming years.
It will essentially be a game of growth through acquisition, leveraged earnings, rinse and repeat.

I expect to see 2-3 M&A partners into 2017, with the $6 billion in NOLs being completely
depleted by 2018-2019.

#25632

Re: WMIH: Analisis de Ali Meshkati

A Meshkati ya lo conozco mas que a ti Simpson, es un bombeador como la copa de un pino. De la misma cepa

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