Más sobre deuda corporativa.
Escribe hoy Campuzano esto:
sobre burbujas, excesos y especulación, aquí les presento un breve estudio elaborado por el FMI que analiza el Tema. Lo hace desde el ámbito de precios y actividad. La profundidad del mercado, en un contexto de baja percepción del riesgo (volatilidad mínima), sin duda contribuye a que los inversores asuman riesgos en busca de una rentabilidad mayor que en condiciones normales no sería posible. Pero ya he comentado antes que el concepto de lo que es o no normal ahora mucho más díficil de concretar.
El articulista considera que en estos momentos las primas de riesgo a nivel empresarial son las candidatas más probables de identificarse con burbujas... precisamente cuando en Europa se discute la posibilidad de que el ECB compre deuda corporativa.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=42459
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the issue of how best to identify speculative asset bubbles (in real-time) remains in flux. This owes to the difficulty of disentangling irrational investor exuberance from the rational response to lower risk based on price behavior alone. In response, I introduce a two-pillar (price and quantity) approach for financial market surveillance. The intuition is straightforward: while asset pricing models comprise a valuable component of the surveillance toolkit, risk taking behavior, and financial vulnerabilities more generally, can also be reflected in subtler, non-price terms. The framework appears to capture stylized facts of asset booms and busts-some of the largest in history have been associated with below average risk premia (captured by the 'pricing pillar') and unusually elevated patterns of issuance, trading volumes, fund flows, and survey-based return projections (reflected in the 'quantities pillar'). Based on a comparison to past boom-bust episodes, the approach is signaling mounting vulnerabilities in risky U.S. credit markets. Policy makers and regulators should be attune to any further deterioration in issuance quality, and where possible, take steps to ensure the post-crisis financial infrastructure is braced to accommodate a re-pricing in credit risk.
Leer más: http://www.estrategiasdeinversion.com/carpatos/sobre-burbujas-especulativas-254353
