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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños

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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños
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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños
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#21769

Re: El EC abre la caja de los truenos.

Dejate de cuentos Simpson los niveles siguen siendo irrisorios mientras la Juez no se pronuncie sobre la confirmacion, el riesgo continua en maximos, cabe recordar que en noviembre las acciones se desplomaron un 75%, despues del fracaso del informe del examiner y aun es hora que llegue a esas valoraciones y se mantengan. Lo repito por enesima vez pueden subir todas las acciones, no mucho si rechaza el POR para esperar nuevos acontecimientos pero si lo confirma se van todas las acciones al garete eliminadas ¿Se puede pedir mas riesgo en una compra de acciones? Autentica basura de bombeo. Que se lo pregunten a los cientos de pillados de marzo de 2010. Al pan pan y al vino vino.

#21771

Cada uno postea segun está posicionado y creo firmemente en que el POR se rechazará

Yo posteo porque creo que la Juez va a rechazar este POR.

No se que mal hago o porque te jode que parezca que el POR se puede rechazar. El IT lo cometieron los 4 no solo Aurelius.
Esperemos a ver como abre Alemania y si seguimos la racha esta tarde en USA.

¿has visto que yo recomiende a alguien comprar? entonces para ya de usar los argumentos de Pumper que ya no cuelan. Estoy mostrando solo un sentimiento de alegría. Nada más.

No quiero que nadie haga algo que no le dictamine su conciencia y la verdad a estas alturas es una decisión muy arriesgada pero eso no me quita que no me pueda expresar alegremente.

Lamento que mi alegría te fastidie tu despertar.

#21772

El EC litiga el Adversary Complaint

http://www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229110815000000000018.pdf

First Sentence of First para
Preliminary Statement

"As previously threatened, the Equity Committee has moved for leave to
file a proposed adversary complaint (the “Complaint”) that seeks to morph its baseless attacks on the Settlement Noteholders into formal claims asserted in the name of the Debtors."

This is exactly what equity/WaMuers have needed to file it's own Adversary Complaint to keep the case open until a just recovery is obtained for EC/Equity Interests....

Remember NO Final Decree (closing of the bankruptcy case) can be provided UNTIL All Adversary issues/complaints are resolved....

EC/Susman team pouring on the heat.....thank you very much...

#21773

El EC deja claro que hubo IT

http://wmish.com/docs/815/8491.pdf

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

2. The evidence admitted at the Plan confirmation Hearing in July demonstrates that the Plan should not be confirmed. That evidence permitted a rare look behind the curtain at the
details of how a bankruptcy plan came into existence.

In this case, it was the product of a disturbing process that operated, with the knowledge and complicity of the Debtors, for the benefit of a favored few – four powerful hedge fund managers who played pivotal roles in orchestrating both the Global Settlement Agreement and the Plan, and who, with the Debtors’ express permission via the terms of confidentiality agreements, were enabled to engage in trading while in possession of non-public information about the details of settlement negotiations over disputed claims worth many billions of dollars. Indeed, it is undisputed that all four of these creditors traded while in possession of details about the settlement negotiations that were unknown to the public. The only issue is whether that information was “material” – and it clearly was.

3. While giving lip service to the goal and the duty to advance the interests of all, the
Debtors in fact abandoned the interests of WMI’s shareholders, allowing these key creditors, who had amassed blocking positions in impaired classes of junior debt, to drive the settlement negotiations far enough to achieve the returns they sought on those securities, but not far enough {00545965;v1} 2
to achieve a recovery for equity. Striving for such a recovery in fact would have been antithetical to the interests of these creditors, and it is evident that the Debtors’ only goal was to achieve a Plan that they would support, thereby assuring a speedy confirmation.

SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE

5. In the following section, the Equity Committee summarizes the evidence admitted
at the Plan Confirmation Hearing relevant to the allegations of insider trading, inequitable
conduct, and the Debtors’ bad faith in proposing the Plan. Additional evidence bearing on these issues and evidence relevant to the Equity Committee’s other objections to plan confirmation will be discussed in the Argument section of this brief.2

A. BACKGROUND ABOUT THE FOUR SETTLEMENT NOTE HOLDERS

6. The allegations of insider trading focus on the conduct of four hedge-fund managers, sometimes referred to as the Settlement Note Holders (“SNHs”) because they were all
originally parties to the Global Settlement Agreement.

7. Aurelius Capital Management, LP (“Aurelius”) is a company that manages three
funds; its primary focus is to invest in “distressed debt”, acquiring the bonds of bankrupt companies and then involving itself in the bankruptcy process in order to “make sure the rights of those particular bonds is respected,” i.e., to seek a profitable return on the investments. (Tr. 7/18 at 38, 124) The firm’s senior partner, and the individual responsible for making Aurelius’ investment decisions, is a former corporate and bankruptcy attorney named Mark Brodsky. (Id.
at 38, 42.) Dan Gropper, who testified at the hearing, is a managing director of the firm and
2 Exhibits admitted at the plan confirmation hearing are cited by exhibit number and transcript excerpts by the abbreviation “Tr.”, followed by the date and page number.
{00545965;v1} 3 typically becomes involved in the bankruptcy and restructuring process as the firm’s representative, dealing with outside counsel and other interested parties. (Id. at 38-39.)

8. Owl Creek Asset Management, L.P. (“Owl Creek”) is an investment fund manager whose strategy includes acquiring the securities of bankrupt companies. (7/19 Tr. at 118.) The firm’s “lead principle” and portfolio manager is Jeff Altman. (Id. at 120.) Daniel
Krueger, who testified at the hearing, is a managing director of the firm and one of three assistant portfolio managers; he was the portfolio manager responsible for Owl Creek’s investment in WMI securities. (Id. at 115-16, 120, 149.)

9. Appaloosa Management LP (“Appaloosa”) is a manager of four hedge funds. (Tr. 7/20 at 38.) Jim Bolin, who testified on behalf of Appaloosa at the hearing, is the senior partner
and portfolio manager. (Tr. 7/20 at 38.) David Tepper controls the general partner of Appaloosa and he and Bolin were the persons responsible for making decisions relating to Appaloosa’s investments in WMI securities. (Tr. 7/20 at 40.)

10. Centerbridge Partners, L.P. (“Centerbridge”) also manages hedge funds. Jeff
Aronson is the founder of the firm, and Vivek Melwani, who testified at the hearing, holds the title of senor managing director, though he did not become a partner of the firm until March 2011. (Tr. 7/20 at 212, 213, 214.) Before joining Centerbridge, he was a bankruptcy partner in the Fried Frank law firm, where he worked for 13 years. (Id. at 213.)

#21774

Simpson tirando balones fuera

El unico que esta jodido en pesar de conciencia eres tu mismo, que ahora no recomiendes no te exime que lo hicieras en 2009 y 2010 dejando a la trupé de pillados. No abogo por la confirmacion del POR, solo soy objetivo con el caso COSA QUE TU NO PORQUE TIENES UN INTERES PERSONAL EN IMPULSAR LAS COTIZACIONES, y al menos evito que nadie apueste por estas acciones sin saber a que se expone. De haber actuado tu del mismo modo no habria pillados con enormes pérdidas junto con otros que ya lo han pérdido casi todo porque han vendido despues de confirmar que lo que vaticinabas era todo MENTIRA.

#21775

Re: Simpson tirando balones fuera

Besugo no digas chorradas mañaneras... la gente no se ha posicionado por lo que yo haya dicho o dejado de decir sino por el mismo motivo que la gente invierte en Bolsa... buscan beneficios... pero también ocurren perdidas.

Yo no soy el que maneja los hilos de Wall Street así que pasaré tus peticiones a una instancia superior :) :)

Yo tengo mi interés personal igual que tu lo tendrias si llevaras mi cartera. Ñam ñam... ¿a que ahora te gusta lo del ñam ñam? pues nada a zamparse todas las que puedas... nos vemos en el otro lado.

#21776

El EC deja a Rosen con el culo al aire (Pag 108)

Beautiful!

151. While in possession of the waterfall matrix provided on March 22, Appaloosa engaged in WMI securities trades on March 29 and March 30; Centerbridge engaged in trading on multiple dates from March 29 through May 15; Aurelius was trading on multiple dates from April 7 through May 7; and Owl Creek was trading on multiple dates from March 29 through April 21. (Tr. 7/20 at 156; AOC 54; AU 8; EC 131.)

202. In retrospect, and in light of the evidence that has surfaced since the December 2010 plan confirmation hearing, it is now apparent that the Debtors’ efforts to investigate and potentially litigate Business Tort Claims against JPMC were simply window-dressing, perhaps intended to keep just enough heat on JPMC to help push the SNH-directed settlement process to consummation sooner rather than later, but not more than that. We now know that while the Debtors were in this Court in January 2010 arguing for additional investigative authority under Rule 2004, they had already transmitted to JPMC a detailed draft settlement agreement, having reached agreements in principle on the resolution of virtually all major issues – the Disputed Accounts, the Tax Refunds, the ownership of the TPS and the Goodwill Litigation, and so on. This Court did not know about those agreements, nor did the public, but the SNHs did.

203. No one involved in the process was looking out for the interests of shareholders or genuinely attempting to maximize the value of the estates for the benefit of all parties. To the contrary, by January 2010, equity was viewed by the Debtors as a nuisance at best and at worst as a threat to accomplishing the deal that they and the SNHs were on the verge of achieving. And so, while representing to this Court in January 2010 that they were guardians of the interests of all, the Debtors sought to disband the Equity Committee – with full knowledge that the deal they were close to achieving would provide nothing to equity.

204. The Debtors’ transparent hostility to shareholders has been revealed over and over again in this case, while their allegiance to the interests of the SNHs has just as clearly been demonstrated repeatedly – to the point of persisting, until this Court finally ruled otherwise, in seeking payment of their attorneys fees and legally unsupportable releases in their favor as components of the Plan.

205. The gross imbalance in the Debtors’ treatment of the SNHs and of equity could hardly be more clear, or more unjustifiable. In a nutshell, the Plan is the product of a deeply flawed process, and the Debtors have failed to carry their burden of proving that it has been submitted in good faith.