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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños

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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños
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Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños
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#23137

Nuevo Grupo Accionistas Minoritarios Post BK en marcha...

For those still awake after the bankruptcy effort, there is some importance to preparing for around the corner in Newco.

The post bankruptcy adversary is different than the bankruptcy ones and the venue is quite different. Although JPM is believed to be in a tiny bit, I don't expect them to remain or even be there after conversion as it would be wise ~ with what they got away with ~ to get very far away. The retail shareholder communication sources ~ GB, iHub, Germans and YB, etc. ~ have really been pounded down by time and results. Many are still banging the bankruptcy even though there is nothing there to do, that part is over. For those who stayed and will be converted to Newco, the game has not changed and retail is outnumbered, outgunned and outflanked.

I hate bullies. I hate those who have corrupted power and influence incongruent with those of decent people. What needs to be done for me is not about money, it is about principle. I know that this may put me on a road to nowhere, but it is what I want to do.

I've been communicating with specialty minority shareholder boutique firms about what Newco will be, the players and the game. They struggle with the concept of any reorganized entity even having such assets as tax attributes of almost $15B, and the concept of proration/abandonment and 382 cleansing for unrestricted use. That has lead me back to some who helped with the preferred ad hoc group who understand the NOLs 100%. They are currently representing a party in the case and the case is not past the effective date. Thereafter, they need to assess any conflicts as their clients are not being cashed out totally, but might also be considered minority shareholders.

So I am attempting to arrange an arrangement of a bankruptcy firm very familiar with the history of the case, and a couple of specialty minority shareholder rights firms of notable reference [re: large pending awards at billions, but also with pending sanctions for behavior ~ i.e., risk takers]. I don't know how this first arrangement attempt will play out, but there is significant interest.

On our side will be the challenge to have retail shareholders access a law firm site with a "Newco Minority Shareholders Rights" area to provide private/secured identity information on Newco shares and acceptance of an outline of the terms and conditions of representation. For example, I believe that there should be no % for the $6.65/Ps equivalent $75M cash value of the deal, little more for the first $50M of NOL PV valuation that it appears equity agreed to in the bankruptcy settlement. It is not a simple matter either; it takes an involved bankruptcy firm to explain to the specialty firm "just WTF I am talking about." I forget that we are the only ones that really know what has gone on, what the numbers are, where they came from and how they were/were not valued.

I'm going to make this attempt [that is what it is, there are no guarantees as these people know exactly who the controlling hedge funds are and what that may do to their firm business model] regardless of anyone's opinion, but subject to the volume of everyones interest. I still second guess my decision almost a year ago not signing on the dotted line in forming the Preferred Ad Hoc Shareholders Group. As events fell into place, I don’t know at this time if it would only have separated preferreds from commons for little additional benefit. However, everyone's opinion is important, and I'm trying to guage if the general interest is underwhelming.

There are questions that I have about what others can assist with:

~ access to Newco's initial shareholder record {very big} for verification of shareholder status; without such it may mean that documented holdings might alternately be required to participation in the Newco Minority Shareholders Group. We aren’t going into this blind to the tactics of the hedge funds.

~ ability and willingness to assist in reputable spreading the message, once there is a message to spread {i.e., the contingent representation of counsel, where to go, what to decide}. It will need to be earlier rather than later as the message boards are already on life support.

I am told that retail shareholders have never done this, especially on this scale and certainly not after an emergence with participation in the reorganized debtor. Oh well, 0-1% seems to be the bar that we have face again.

Again, for me this is not about any personal gain and I hold no judgment against anyone whose interest and time actually is dedicated to investment and earnings. No problem at all with that at all. It is important for me to follow through on the actual amount and the post emergence value of the NOLs, the certain adversarial and litigious valuation battle of all battles under Business Judgment, Enhanced or Entire Fairness Standards in Delaware (which is where I believe this will be when these corporate actions begin after reincorporation). Note, there will be no PJS as it appears that the taint of their bankruptcy lack of valuation and low ball critique will be a hurdle in addition to the Blackstone valuation of such. It is more important to stand upright once again after the bankruptcy gut punch and trying to inflict some preemptive preparatory planning prior to the next battle [i.e., not waiting to get corporate action and being on the defensive out of the gate].

Also, MW, the EC and SG do not represent us, and cannot be held accountable for us, after the effective date. They’ve done what they were responsible and obligated to do. We need to provide for our own representation going forward and it will need to be determined if we could still be a significant combined retail shareholder group that can make a difference.

Again, thoughts and opinions welcomed. Unless there is an underwhelming [lack of] interest of those who have made the release exchanges, I will make the best effort to move this strategy along.

#23138

Rule 2004 ¿un activo escondido?

Paying project west?
(e) Transfer of Assets to the Debtors. In further consideration for the satisfaction,
settlement, release and discharge of, and in exchange for, the Turnover Action and the Rule 2004 Inquiry, and as further consideration for the releases and other benefits provided to JPMC pursuant to this Plan, and as set forth in the Global Settlement Agreement, the JPMC Entities shall sell, transfer, and assign to the WMI Entities,
and the WMI Entities shall acquire, pursuant to the Plan and sections 363 and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, any and all right, title and interest any of the JPMC Entities may have in, among other assets, (i) the WMI Rabbi Trust and the WMI Policies, (ii) the stock of H.S. Loan Corporation, (iii) the Registry Funds and the American Savings Escrow Funds, and (iv) the WMI Intellectual Property, in each case, free and clear of all Liens, Claims, interests and encumbrances of any Entity.

flow,

It seems this is very open ended if you read between the lines....key words, "among other assets"

Are they trying to tell us there are other assets their hiding at the present time? I believe it ain't over yet. Why would they insert "among other assets" Hmmmmmmmmm

"all right, title and interest any of the JPMC Entities may have in, among other assets,(i) the WMI Rabbi Trust and the WMI Policies, (ii) the stock of H.S. Loan Corporation, (iii) the Registry Funds and the American Savings Escrow Funds, and (iv) the WMI Intellectual Property,"

#23139

Re: Rule 2004 ¿un activo escondido?

Simpson mas vale que organices un grupo de accionistas como el que se postula en USA para tener alguna representación en el Consejo antes de que M.W. presidente del EC y el resto del Comité se pula todo el capital de la nueva organizada, cualquiera se fia de toda esa pandilla de chupopteros que han conseguido que las acciones toquen fondo por los acuerdos alcanzados. Lo que realmente esta fuera de lugar es que incluyeran la clausula de que las acciones podrian no cotizar nunca. Personalmente paso de todo este asunto porque finalmente me quede con una minucia de acciones H´s y vendí todas las preferentes antes de las votaciones, pero sabe mal por todos los pillados que pretenden recuperar algo de lo invertido. Bastante desgracia tienen con la estopa que han recibido hasta la fecha.

#23140

Re: Rule 2004 ¿un activo escondido?

Let's not be too pessimistic because Deanna Oppenheimer will be our next CEO and Washington Mutual Inc will be the greatest (trade) bank ever and it will come clean of all of its past sins and JPM will hold a 20% stake of it and it will be our greatest friend ever :)

#23141

Muchas dudas en el horizonte

Solo una cosa clara...el 8 de marzo salimos de Bancarrota y las aciones se convertiran a la NewCo.

1. Hay muchos activos sin aparecer que nadie sabe (si hay un pacto si van a volver o si se han perdido en la aspiradora de JPM).

2. Muchos NOL´s que van desde $17 Billones a $32 Billones según quien haga los cálculos.
3. Nuevo BOD con 5 miembros del EC y uno de ellos El Juez.

#23142

Re: Muchas dudas en el horizonte

Tus seguidores lo que quieren es recuperar el capital inicial, con eso ya les vale.

#23143

TPS

Why TPS agreed with the Plan for an additional 5% stake out of from commons?
-the 1.5B TPS if eventually successfull could obtain 1.5B collaterals from its pursuit of the litigation against JPMC with no cerntainty.
-their original pie is at max. 4B.
-in newco, their pie could grow to more than 5B. [15B NOL x 35% = 5.25B tax savings]
-under 70/30 split of 95%, 1.5B TPS could gain
[(95% x 70% x 1.5) x 200M shares / 7.5] x 5.25B = 26.6%
26.6% x 5.25B = 1.3965B
-under 75/25 split of 95%, 1.5B TPS could gain
[(95% x 75% x 1.5) x 200M shares / 7.5] x 5.25B = 28.5%
28.5% x 5.25B = 1.49625B
For that 5% take, it pushes their recovery to 1.5B and gives them a "cerntainty". The left concern is how they can use the NOLs. From now on TPS and the hegies will dig thru their vault to find out ways to steal more from you. Watch.
There is no agreement on, to date, how much NOLs are available. >15B ? or >20B? Who knows?
And why TPS refused to cooperate at the earlier stage? The TPS group in the court can at max get their 1.5B back. Why 1.39B recovery from the use of NOLs was not attractive to them earlier? Huh? Remember, they bought cheap.

The TPSC owned $1.5B of the $4B in trust preferred securities, so it will measure the extent of its recovery by representing the amount as a percentage of $1.5B.

Former preferreds of all stripes had $7.5B in old face and hold 142.5MM (75%) of Newco. As TPSC held $1.5B or 20% of old face it gets 28.5MM shares of Newco. Each Newco share would have to be worth $52.63 for it to realize par on its old TPS securities.

It isn't likely that Newco can achieve this simply through savings on the NOLs, however such savings could get them (and retail) very close to 50% of par assuming $15B in unrestricted NOLs and a 35% rate, which would yield $5B in cash.

If the foregoing is correct, we infer old common has a new par of $2.5B through its 25% stake in Newco.

#23144

Bopfan y las suposiciones de Buyout/merger

Another possibility is a buyout/merger with an existing business entity.

Such a business entity would certainly offer its stock in return for combining with Newco.

In this case, if the NOLs were valued at $20B they would have a cash worth of $7B. As you and I agree, Newco would not get anything like that; my guess is Newco would get stock valued between $3.5B and $4B. This would account for the acquirer's share of the benefit, risk, time value of money, etc.

As I said yesterday, since the total par of preferreds was $7.5B, and old WMI preferreds are getting 75% of the 95% of Newco, the old WMI commmon getting 25% of the 95% of Newco, then Newco has a par in excess of $10B (it must to account for the other 5% of Newco): about $10.53B or so (.95x/$10B=$10.526B). This means that the new par values are $526MM for the holders of the 5% of Newco, $7.5B for the former WMI preferreds, and $2.5B for the old WMI common.

If Newco were to receive $4B in stock, then each Newco share would receive 38% of par ($4B/$10.53B). Assuming the acquirer were prosperous and its stock enjoyed a healthy growth rate, that 38% of par could reach 100% in a few years, at nominal risk to former WMI interest holders.

In my opinion this is infinitely preferable to experimenting with the untested business model of a nascent enterprise, and for that reason (and others) I hope Newco is bought quickly or retail is bought out by the HFs (including TPSC).